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Abstract 
In explaining England's early industrial development, previous research has highlighted that wealthy 
pre-industrial elites had more surviving offspring than their poorer counter- parts. Thus, 
entrepreneurial traits spread and helped England grow rich. We contest this view, showing that lower-
class reproduction rates were no different from the elites when accounting for singleness and 
childlessness. Elites married less and were more often childless. Many died without descendants (decessit 
sine prole). We find that the middle classes had the highest reproduction and argue that this advantage 
was instrumental to England's economic success because the middle class invested most strongly in 
human capital. 
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1 Introduction
In attempting to explain the historical economic success of England and Western Europe more
generally, scholars have long turned to di↵erences in demographic regimes across countries as
a potentially important factor. Malthus (1798) first raised the point arguing that high fertility
from low ages at marriage and low celibacy in China prevented any material improvements
in living standards whereas the preventive check, which limited fertility, allowed for incomes
slightly above subsistence in England. Malthus’s preventive check has been refined over time
into what Hajnal (1965) defined as the European Marriage Pattern (EMP). Characterised by
late age at marriage, high rates of celibacy and the prevalence of nuclear households, Hajnal
argued that the EMP was common west of a line from St. Petersburg to Trieste and less
common to the east. Thus, the EMP allowed Europeans to control their fertility and experience
living standards above subsistence (Voigtla¨nder and Voth 2013). In addition, De Moor and
Van Zanden (2010) and Foreman-Peck (2011) have argued that the European Marriage Pattern
influenced economic development not only by limiting population growth but also by promoting
higher investment in human capital, especially since women were given high levels of agency in
the system.
Sitting alongside these arguments, several theoretical contributions (Galor and Moav 2002;
de la Croix and Doepke 2003; Clark 2007; Galor and Moav 2001) have argued that the internal
demographic dynamics of pre-Industrial societies (or of least developed societies) mattered for
human capital formation. In particular, Galor and Moav (2002) has suggested that the struggle
for survival during most of human existence had generated an evolutionary advantage to human
traits that were complementary to the growth process, and that this eventually triggered the
take-o↵ of modern economic growth. Their theory considers two types of families: quantity
families, prone to having many, but less educated o↵spring, and quality families, prone to having
fewer, but more educated children (in a Beckerian sense). Because quality families invested
in their children’s education, their children earned comparatively higher wages than their low-
quality counterparts, which a↵orded educated individuals more o↵spring than uneducated ones.
Quality families therefore had an evolutionary advantage over quantity families, causing their
share in the population to rise and eventually leading to birth-restriction behaviour. On the
evidence side, several studies have explored the historical link between various measures of
income on the one hand and fertility or population growth on the other (e.g. Galor and Klemp
2014; Vogl 2016; Ashraf and Galor 2011; Clark and Hamilton 2006; Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and
Weisdorf 2011). Two studies in particular (Clark and Hamilton 2006, Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp,
and Weisdorf 2011) have provided pre-Industrial evidence that better educated and thus more
wealthy individuals had higher net reproduction rates. Clark (2007) relied on these findings
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to argue that the Industrial Revolution emerged from the spread of what he called capitalist
values, including prudence, hard work and delayed gratification, from the rich to the rest of
society as the rich experienced downward social mobility.
Both of these strands in the literature have contributed to our understanding of demographic
change and economic development, but each has some problematic assumptions that need to
be addressed more carefully. For the EMP, Dennison and Ogilvie (2014) have found that the
di↵erences in demographic regimes were not so di↵erent in Eastern and Western Europe, and
they also show that demographic regimes were not homogenous within a country. At the same
time, the survival of the richest literature has not properly accounted for di↵erential rates of
celibacy and childlessness across classes when computing the reproductive success of each group
(Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and Weisdorf 2011).
This paper addresses these earlier shortcomings by analysing the internal fertility dynamics of
pre-Industrial England, leading to a substantial revision of previous conclusions about what
caused the wealth of nations. We use the family reconstitution data collected from English
parish registers and assembled by the Cambridge Group (Wrigley et al. 1997) to estimate the
reproductive success of di↵erent wealth groups. Compared to previous attempts to measure
reproductive success in historical England, which calculate reproductive rates conditional on
giving birth, our study considers both the intensive margin, i.e. an individual’s number of
surviving o↵spring, and the extensive margin, i.e. whether or not an individual married or had
children at all (Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder 2014 and Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi
2015). Thus, we explore reproductive success across four margins: two extensive margins - the
choice to marry and the choice to have children - and two intensive margins - the number of
children born and the child death rate.
Our empirical exercise also proposes a novel methodological approach, which enables us to
estimate the reproductive contribution of women who died before completing their reproductive
period (something that happened often in the past). Whereas Weir (1984), Schofield (1985)
and other historical demographers usually evaluate women’s reproductive success at the end of
their reproductive period (usually after the age of 40 or 50), we use a Cox proportional hazards
model instead. This model allows us to estimate the risk of demographic events occurring by
means of survival curves which start at the age at which a woman becomes at risk of the event
(i.e. age 16 for marriage). This way we are able to explore the reproductive potential of a
much larger share of a historical population than is normally the case in studies of women’s
reproductive success.
By accounting for the four margins of reproduction we are able to reconstruct class-specific
historical demography in England. Our findings dispute the previous view that the upper
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classes had more surviving o↵spring than the lower classes. We show that the middle classes
were the most successful socio-economic group in terms of reproduction once taking account
of the extensive margin of fertility. Merchants, professionals and gentry, the upper classes,
had high rates of celibacy and childlessness driving down their overall reproductive success,
whereas labourers, servants and husbandmen had much lower rates of celibacy and childlessness
but limited their fertility within marriage likely through birth spacing (Cinnirella, Klemp,
and Weisdorf 2017). Thus, the middle classes combined high fertility and low celibacy and
childlessness and therefore had the highest net reproduction rates.
We argue that this demographic regime provides a better explanation for historical England’s
economic success than those put forth in the previous work highlighted above. Middle class
families were more likely to invest in apprenticeships for their children (Minns and Wallis 2012)
and according to Crouzet (1985) more than 85 per cent of England’s early industrialists came
from a middle-class background. Thus, the reproductive advantage of middle class English
families in the pre-Industrial era helped to create preconditions necessary for the Industrial
Revolution.
2 Theoretical and Historiographical Underpinnings
In this section, we provide a theoretical approach to calculating the four margins of fertility.
Then we provide a brief summary of celibacy, childlessness, survival of the richest and the EMP
explaining how our study intervenes in the existing literature.
2.1 A Theoretical Decomposition of the Data
As mentioned above, our paper considers two neglected aspects of overall fertility: celibacy
and childlessness. We present di↵erences in the four margins of fertility by social group using
the following framework (extending the approach in Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2017)).
Households are heterogenous by social class c. We consider two types of marital status: married
and singles. The marriage rate depends on c: m(c). We assume singles do not have children.
Net reproduction n(·) as a function of social class c is:
n(c) = m(c) (1  z(c)) b(c) (1  d(c)) (1)
where z(c) is the fraction of childless married women, b(c) is the number of births conditional
on being married and having children, and d(c) is the mortality rate of children aged 0 to 15.
Equation (1) can be seen from the point of view of women or men, and we conduct the analysis
for both. However, as in the vast majority of studies of fertility, we take women’s fertility as our
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baseline and report the findings for male fertility in Appendix H. Although it is theoretically
possible to estimate z(c) and b(c) for all marriages not just bachelor/spinster marriages, we
limit ourselves to bachelor/spinster marriages. This assumption does not influence our final
results and is driven by weaknesses in the data explained more fully in Section 4.2. Finally, in
order to interpret di↵erences in net reproduction as di↵erences in survival among occupational
groups, we must assume high levels of marital homogamy. This assumption will be discussed
further in Section 3.
Although social class is normally captured by a discrete variable, in the following it is more
convenient for the exposition to think about social class as a continuous variable. Usually, the
literature finds that in pre-industrial societies the social gradient of births is positive (Skirbekk
et al. 2008), b0(c)   0, and the social gradient in mortality is negative or nil, d0(c)  0, i.e.
wealthier households have larger families and experience lower rates of child mortality. In most
of the literature, one considers marital fertility, implying that the marriage margin is constant
(Wrigley et al. 1997, p. 428), and in some cases the extensive margin of fertility is constant too
(Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and Weisdorf 2011), m(c) = m¯ and z(c) = z¯, implying that the e↵ect of
social class on fertility is positive,
n0(c) = m¯(1  z¯) ((1  d(c))b0(c)  b(c)d0(c)) > 0,
as b0(c)   0 and d0(c) < 0.
In general though, the e↵ect of social class on reproduction n is the sum of four e↵ects:
n0(c) = (1  z(c))b(c)(1  d(c))m0(c)| {z }
marriage margin
 m(c)b(c)(1  d(c)) z0(c)| {z }
childlessness margin| {z }
Extensive margins of fertility
+m(c)(1  z(c)) ((1  d(c)) b0(c)   b(c) d0(c))| {z }
intensive margin of fertility
.
If marriage rates decrease with social class and/or childlessness rates increase with social class,
it is possible that the rich would not be so reproductively successful after all. Formally, this
happens when
b(c)(1  d(c))(m(c)z0(c)  (1  z(c))m0(c) > m(c)(1  z(c))((1  d(c))b0(c)  b(c)d0(c)). (2)
If marriage rates and/or childlessness rates are non-monotonic functions of social class, the
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Figure 1: Schematic View of How the EMP Relates to the Four Margins of Reproductive Success
pattern of reproductive success can become more complicated. To know whether condition (2)
holds in reality, one needs to estimate z(c), m(c), b(c) and d(c) from data.
The relation between our decomposition (1) and the so-called European Marriage Pattern
(EMP) is explained in Figure 1. The bigger rectangle represents the maximum reproduction
obtained when 100 per cent of women (horizontal axis) marry at age 15 (vertical axis). The
usual representation of the European Marriage Pattern argues that by delaying marriage and
having some dose of celibacy, the span of reproduction is reduced. In this paper, we consider the
vertical line 1 m(c) as dependent on social class. We add a second vertical line, representing
childless couples. Taking into account child mortality, represented by the inner rectangle, we
are left with the grey area representing reproduction. Thus, our paper calculates the size of the
shaded box for di↵erent social groups to understand the social gradient in reproductive success.
2.2 Previous Literature on the Extensive Margin: Celibacy
We are not the first to address the marriage margin (or celibacy) and its influence on historical
demographic change and economic development. Scholars commonly agree that the proportion
of unmarried women in early modern England was nontrivial (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014).
But there is disagreement about how important celibacy was in slowing population growth and
whether celibacy di↵ered across social groups.
The importance of celibacy for the early modern demographic regime has been contested. Both
Hajnal (1965) and Wrigley and Schofield (1981) emphasised age at marriage as the the most
important factor maintaining the preventive check and reducing population pressure. However,
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Weir (1984) reworked Wrigley and Schofield’s figures arguing that most of the change in fertility
in the seventeenth century was driven by changes in the rate of celibacy with a shift toward
age at marriage in the eighteenth century. This was quite a provocative idea since it challenged
the then dominant servant model of the preventive check in England first proposed by Malthus
(1798) and refined by Hajnal (1965) whereby in poor economic conditions, servants delayed
marriage until they could accumulate the resources to set up a new household. If fertility was
being driven by the decision of whether or not to marry at all, then other mechanisms had to
be at play.
Relative to this earlier literature, this paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides
the first analysis of celibacy from micro-data rather than from aggregate statistics. Second, it
suggests that there are substantial di↵erences in celibacy across social groups and highlights
the heterogeneity of experience of marriage patterns within a society. Third, it considers the
influence of celibacy on fertility alongside the other three margins influencing fertility, providing
a greater understanding of the extent to which celibacy matters to overall fertility.
2.3 Previous Literature on the Extensive Margin: Childlessness
On the second aspect of the extensive margin of fertility, childlessness, very little has been
said for pre-industrial societies. It is often assumed that being married implied a desire for
children, and the observed childlessness rate is a measure of natural sterility in a population
(Leridon 2008). For England, Wrigley et al. (1997) discuss sterility as a part of their discussion
of marital fertility, mainly attributing sterility to biological factors. They argued that the
main factor influencing entry sterility, i.e. married couples who did not have children, was the
mother’s age at marriage since only 2.6 and 3.8 per cent of women who married at ages 15-19 or
20-24 respectively never bore children whereas 69.3 per cent of women who were first married at
the age of 40-44 never bore children. Across all ages entry sterility varied between 8.3 and 11.5
per cent during the early modern period generally following overall trends in fertility (p. 403).
Hollingsworth (1965), who studied the demographics of British nobles based on genealogical
records, finds an average rate of childlessness at 24 per cent, based on all persons ever married,
a surprisingly high rate compared with other populations and the average entry sterility rates
for English provincial parishes (Wrigley et al. 1997, pp. 395-397).
Beyond biological factors, there might also be economic determinants of childlessness. Three
recent papers stress those determinants for US data in a historical perspective. Gobbi (2013)
shows how childlessness rates and fertility rates co-move over time as a function of shocks to
the gender wage gap and to the cost of having children. Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder
(2014) focus on a quantity-quality trade-o↵ faced by parents and look at how the Rosenwald
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Rural Schools Initiative in the early twentieth century a↵ected fertility along both the extensive
and intensive margins. They show that the expansion of schooling opportunities decreased the
price of child quality. This reduction in the price of child quality decreased the proportion of
women with the highest fertility rates as expected, but it also led to a decrease in childlessness
rates as more women entered on the extensive margin. In addition, Baudin, de la Croix, and
Gobbi (2015) provide a framework to understand the deep causes of childlessness and how their
importance has changed over time. Using US census data, they find that the main causes of
childlessness across the past 100 years have changed from poverty-induced necessity to a choice
driven by higher levels of income and education among women.
2.4 Previous Literature on the Survival of the Richest
The question of reproduction and its link to the dynamics of development and inequality goes
back to work on di↵erential fertility by Althaus (1980) in a neo-classical growth model, de la
Croix and Doepke (2003) in an endogenous growth model and Galor and Moav (2002) in a
unified growth framework. Galor and Moav (2002) model the industrial revolution as resulting
from a change in the composition of the population. They suppose preferences are of two types,
quantity (Q) and quality (q). Couples endowed with Q prefer, ceteris paribus, having more
children with low investment while couples endowed with q like to invest in the human capital
of their children. If during the Malthusian period of stagnation quality couples benefit from an
evolutionary advantage, then their share in the population rises slowly over time and eventually
leads to a take-o↵ in income. These couples would have an evolutionary advantage having
more grandchildren than their more fertile counterparts because human capital accumulation
would increase earning possibilities for their children and higher earnings would allow their
children to have more o↵spring. This view has been supported by empirical work by Galor
and Klemp (2014) using Canadian genealogy data. Galor and Moav (2002) model quality
people as those who value the education of their children, but these people could also be those
with an entrepreneurial spirit (Clark 2007, Galor and Michalopoulos 2012). However, for this
mechanism to work, there must be strong persistence in the inherited traits across generations
whether the traits are inherited through genetic or cultural transmission (Bowles 2007).
While many studies have explored the determinants of fertility in the past, three studies have
focused specifically on the relationship between income and reproduction in England. In their
seminal article, Clark and Hamilton (2006) tested the hypothesis that the rich had higher net
reproduction rates than the poor. They motivated their study using a basic Malthusian frame-
work involving two components: a positive link between income and fertility and diminishing
returns to labour in production. The combination of these components produces a long-run
equilibrium where income is maintained at the level of subsistence and population growth is
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absent. However, because income in this equilibrium was not distributed equally across the
population, the rich would leave more surviving o↵spring than the poor. Clark and Hamilton
provided evidence for their theory by analysing wills in South-East England between 1585 and
1638 (see Figure B.1), using wealth at death as a proxy for income and children mentioned
in the will as a proxy for surviving o↵spring. They found that the richest testators left twice
as many o↵spring as the poorest. Clark and Cummins (2015) extended Clark and Hamilton’s
initial analysis by collecting wills from the same counties from 1500-1914. They found that
the rich had a higher net reproduction throughout the early modern period until 1780 when
fertility began to fall among the wealthiest tercile of testators. Interestingly, they also regressed
net reproduction on occupational status and wealth and found that their occupational status
dummies became insignificant when controlling for wealth decile.
The probate records that Clark and Hamilton (2006) and Clark and Cummins (2015) rely upon
have some strengths: they capture all probated men dying in a given geographical area so the
only censoring from migration is for migrants abroad or deaths at sea; fertility is measured
across all marriages; and some form of wealth is ascribed to all probated, so there are no issues
related to the recording of occupations. However, the will evidence is not perfect. It only
exists for men who left a will or were probated. Most rich men were probated, but fewer poor
people were. Thus, if the poor people who were probated were non-randomly selected from the
population of poor people, there could be potential biases in the probate sample. Clark and
Cummins (2015) show that there were not substantial di↵erences in marriage rates and fertility
between probated and non-probated men in the nineteenth century, but it is not clear whether
this pattern would hold for earlier centuries. In addition, because wills did not always report
all surviving children and did not always provide complete wealth information, i.e. real estate
value, land area or personal wealth were missing, Clark and Cummins had to impute these
values for a large share of their data. Their net fertility estimates are very high relative to the
net reproduction rates estimated by Wrigley et al. (1997) for early modern England.1 Their
will databases are also restricted to three counties in southeastern England: Su↵olk, Essex and
Surrey. These areas were more highly developed in the middle ages and early modern period
and were far from the centres of the Industrial Revolution in the Northwest and West Midlands.
Thus, the Wrigley et al. (1997) data provides substantially better geographic coverage than the
wills database (see Figure B.1). We also believe that our more comprehensive measure of class,
discussed in detail below, will better capture the fertility behaviour of the lower classes than
the will data. These weaknesses, mostly a product of the historical sources that survive, do not
in themselves invalidate these authors’ earlier results, but they do highlight the value of testing
1The Wrigley et al. (1997) net reproduction rates have to be multiplied by two to capture both males and
females, but they average 2.37 from 1536-1780 far lower than the values coming from the Clark and Cummins
(2015) will database.
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their hypothesis with a di↵erent dataset.
In addition to the papers based on probate evidence, Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and Weisdorf (2011)
used the same family reconstitution dataset used in the current study to test the relationship
between wealth and fertility. However, rather than measuring wealth directly, Boberg et al.
used occupational titles to sort individuals into social groups that were roughly correlated
with wealth. Boberg et al. also found that the wealthiest occupational groups had higher
fertility up until c. 1800 after which they were outperformed by the poorest groups. This shift
in evolutionary advantage might have emerged with the ending of the Malthusian era (Clark
2007, Galor 2012) and with the rich beginning the demographic transition (fertility decline)
earlier than the poor (Livi-Bacci 1986, de la Croix 2012 in Chapter 3). However, Boberg et
al. measure fertility conditional on engaging in marriage and giving birth, so they ignore the
extensive margin of fertility, which we find to be so important in this paper. Thus, the potential
weaknesses in the will data and methodological problems with the earlier parish reconstitution
studies provide justification for revisiting the survival of the richest question in this study.
2.5 Previous Literature on the European Marriage Pattern
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the European Marriage Pattern (EMP), which is
one of the strongest models explaining how demographic behaviour influenced economic devel-
opment in the pre-Industrial era. Hajnal (1965) first described the pattern and it has been
expanded since then. Hajnal argued that there were key di↵erences between the demographic
and social context in Northwestern Europe and elsewhere in the world. In Northwestern Europe,
high rates of celibacy, late ages of marriage and the formation of new, nuclear households at
marriage created an economic system that prevented population growth and fostered economic
development.
There are two explanations of the origins of the EMP. De Moor and Van Zanden (2010) argue
that norms of consent among marriage partners which emerged in Catholic doctrine in the ninth
century led to more respect for and empowerment of women, producing the EMP, whereas
Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2013) argue that the population shock of the Black Death and women’s
comparative advantage in the pastoral sector improved women’s labour market opportunities
and led to later marriage. In the more traditional argument, the EMP influenced economic
development by reducing fertility and preventing population growth from capturing all of the
growth achieved through improvements in technology or extensive expansion in the area under
agriculture (Voigtla¨nder and Voth 2013).
However, the schematic and somewhat simplified view of the EMP in England has recently
been challenged on a number of fronts. First, Dennison and Ogilvie (2014) have conducted a
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meta-analysis of the demographic characteristics of a number of European countries on both
sides of Hajnal’s line. They collected systematic information on female age at first marriage,
celibacy rates and household complexity and found no correlation between key elements of
Hajnal’s European Marriage Pattern and economic development. In addition, two other papers
have shown that people living in early modern England may have had a larger degree of fertility
control than had been assumed, a fundamental breach of the traditional Malthusian population
model. Kelly and O´ Gra´da (2012), studying counts of births in 404 English parishes, found
evidence that births responded to economic conditions in early modern England with parishes
having fewer births when economic conditions were bad. Cinnirella, Klemp, and Weisdorf
(2017) also found that the probability of having a child was lower when conditions were bad
analysing the individual-level family reconstitution data employed in this paper. If families
were able to limit their fertility within marriage, then the rates of celibacy and age at marriage
might have been less important than the proponents of the EMP have thought.
Our contribution to this literature is to analyse the workings of the EMP within wealth groups
of one country to give an idea of how the EMP was practiced within pre-Industrial English
society. This analysis will reveal the extent to which the EMP factors were heterogeneous
across groups.
3 Database
The Data. We use the family reconstitution data collected by the Cambridge Group for the
History of Population and Social Structure and described in detail by Wrigley et al. (1997).
The full dataset includes over 300,000 individuals recorded in registers coming from a total of
26 provincial, English parishes (see Figure B.1). The data are drawn from baptism, marriage
and burial registers kept by the local parish priest, which have been systematically linked
so that individuals can be tracked across their lifetime from birth, to marriage, to the birth
(and potentially burial) of their children, to their own burial (Wrigley 1966). In addition to
the demographic events present in the registers, male occupations were often recorded upon a
man’s marriage or burial or when his children were baptised. It is from these occupations that
we construct our social groups.
To provide an idea of how the reconstitution data work, Figure 2 shows the example of John
Cheney from the parish of Banbury. John was born outside the parish, so we do not observe
his birth date in the baptism register. He appears in our dataset when he marries Elizabeth
Treadwell in Banbury in 1766. Unfortunately, Elizabeth and their only child died by 1770,
so in the same year, John married Elizabeth Nicholls, with whom he went on to have seven
children. Among the children from his second marriage, four died within two years of birth.
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Figure 2: The Reconstitution Data in Miniature - The life of John Cheney from Banbury
The youngest child, Thomas, married and died at age 38 in the parish. We assume Elizabeth
Ann migrated out of the parish since we do not observe her marriage or burial. Finally, John’s
son John (the surviving one) married in the parish and then migrated since we do not observe
his burial. John’s second wife died in 1802, and he passed away in 1808. We can also track John
(the father)’s occupation over time. His occupation is initially recorded at his first marriage
as inn holder. Then, by his second marriage in 1770 he has become a victualler, though he is
listed as an inn keeper in the baptism register in relation to the birth of his children (1771-86).
At his burial in 1808, John was listed as being a printer, suggesting substantial upward social
mobility in his lifetime. John’s upward mobility is corroborated by the fact that the Cheney
family printers published a special book in 1967 (Cheneys 1967) to celebrate their 200-year
publishing history in Banbury beginning with John Cheney. Clearly, the family reconstitutions
provide a wealth of data on the early modern English society and economy.
The 26 parishes were chosen by the Cambridge Group because they were geographically dis-
persed across England (see map in Appendix B Figure B.1) and had high data quality. While
the full data cover 1541 to 1851, not all of the 26 parishes span the entire time period: some
parishes only contain records for earlier or later periods. Moreover, there was a rise in non-
conformism in England at the end of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century,
which meant that in some parishes where non-conformism was important, a lot of vital events
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went unreported in Church of England registers. Thus, the years for which the data are reliable
are di↵erent from the years for which reconstitution data exist.
Fortunately, Wrigley et al. (1997) conducted a careful analysis of the reliability of the registers
and report the corresponding dates for each parish (p. 22-23). We accordingly introduce our
own censoring dates at the reliable start and stop year for each parish. We require the marriage
date to be 15 years before the end of the reliable period. This strategy ensures that we observe
nearly all of a woman’s potential children, but we would not lose observations because we did
not observe the mother’s death date until after the records became less reliable. The censoring
leads to a loss of individual observations of 21.6 per cent.
Social Groups. In order to measure the four margins of fertility across a social gradient, we
must first sort occupations in our dataset into meaningful social groups. There are a number
of ways that we could sort the occupations, including by HISCLASS (Van Leeuwen and Maas
2011) or the nineteenth-century British professional groups (Armstrong, 1972, Long, 2013), but
we have opted to follow the previous literature and use Clark and Hamilton (2006)’s wealth
categories which were also employed by Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and Weisdorf (2011) and Clark
and Cummins (2015). These reflect occupations that were frequently recorded in wills by wealth
and social status. However, one limitation of our study is that we cannot observe wealth directly
as Clark and Hamilton (2006) and Clark and Cummins (2015) do. Some farmers in our data
may have been wealthier than some of the merchants and lower gentry. Thus, these occupational
groups reflect a combination of social status and wealth.
Group one consisted of mainly labourers and servants. Group two contains small farmers
(husbandmen) and rural, low-skill manufacturing workers such as weavers. Group three was
mainly made up of craftsmen such as tailors and skilled construction workers, whereas group
four were traders and lower working proprietors. Group five consisted of farmers, which unlike
the poorer husbandmen, had large amounts of agricultural lands and employed wage labor to
work their farms. Thus, they were of a higher wealth and social group than the small-scale
farmers and labourers in groups one and two. Group six contains merchants and professionals
such as clerks, clerics and higher working proprietors. Finally, group seven represents the landed
gentry who often had occupations listed as gentleman or esquire.
There was a small degree of occupational mobility within an individual’s lifetime. We discuss
this at length in Appendix C. There is also a concern with our assumption that the husband’s
occupation can be taken as a useful proxy of the household occupational status, even when
we are calculating net reproduction for women. From a historical perspective, this is justi-
fied. Early modern England was a patriarchal society where men had many more opportunities
and advantages than women, making the husband’s occupational status particularly salient for
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fertility decisions. However, it is true that if people regularly married outside their occupa-
tional group, defined by the occupation of their father, this could attenuate di↵erences in net
reproduction across groups. Accordingly, we attempted to measure marital homogamy in our
data. We were only able to find both the groom’s father’s occupation and the bride’s father’s
occupation for 4.5 per cent of married couples because we cannot observe these occupations for
in-migrants. 42.7 per cent of these couples married within their own social group. However,
this figure is a severe underestimate of the degree of assortative matching since these couples
chose from the smallest marriage pool possible: only people born and never migrating from one
parish. Therefore, there are likely many individuals who migrated to find a partner in their
own group or imported one into their own parish, especially among the wealthier classes. We
see this to be true when looking at emigrants and immigrants below (see Tables 3 and 4).
In our final analysis of fertility, we have chosen to combine group six, merchants and profession-
als, and group seven, gentry. We do this because our sample size for group seven is very small
on certain margins and the demographic behaviour of the two groups was very similar. Com-
bining the two groups also adds analytical clarity since both would have been the wealthiest in
society at the time. Thus, we are left with six occupational groups, across which we can test
for di↵erences in marriage rates, childlessness, marital fertility and child mortality. However,
we still include the people for whom the father’s occupation is unknown (59.8 per cent) in the
regressions, as these contribute to identifying the baseline hazard rate and the parish and time
fixed e↵ects.
4 Measuring the Four Margins of Fertility
We can now turn to measuring the four margins of reproductive success laid out in the theory
above. Recall that net reproduction n(·) as a function of social class c is:
n(c) = m(c)(1  z(c))b(c)(1  d(c)),
where m(c) is the percentage of women who marry, z(c) is the fraction of childless married
women, b(c) is the number of births conditional on being married and having children, and d(c)
is the mortality rate of children aged 0 to 15. When studying childlessness (or fertility at other
parities), prior studies have usually relied on so-called completed marriages, marriages where
both spouses survive until the woman reached the age of 50 (Wrigley et al. 1997). The rates
childlessness (z(c)), marital fertility (b(c)) and child mortality (d(c)) can then be estimated using
a sample of women who reached the end of their reproductive period, say aged 50+. However,
as we are interested in the reproductive success of di↵erent social groups, we should not neglect
the contribution of women who died prematurely, i.e. before age 50, to reproduction. Although
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these women will have fewer children than those with completed fertility, their children still
contribute to reproductive success. We therefore use Cox Proportional Hazard models for
censored data to estimate the four margins, m(c), z(c), b(c) and d(c). Following the Cox
model, the risk h(t, x,  ) (of getting married, of having a child, of dying) of an individual with
characteristics x changes with the survival time t according to
h(t, x,  ) = h0(t) exp[x ],
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard. As regressors x we use the six occupational dummies defined
above plus a dummy for individuals of unknown occupation, and we control for parish and time
fixed e↵ects by including twenty-six parish dummies and four time dummies (one for each
quartile of the data ranked by year of marriage: 1538-1649, 1650-1718, 1719-1769, 1769-1836)
in the regressions.2 The time dummies refer to the parents’ marriage year for m(c) and d(c)
and to a couple’s marriage year for z(c) and b(c). The reference category is a Labourer/Servant
married in 1650-1718 in the parish of Alcester.
The estimated vector of parameters  ˆ is found by maximising the partial likelihood, which
does not depend on how the baseline hazard h0(t) is specified. However, to compute m(c),
z(c), b(c) and d(c), we need to estimate the cumulative hazard function and the corresponding
survival. The baseline hazard, required in this computation, is obtained using the Nelson-Aalen
estimator. Denoting t1, t2, . . . the distinct event times, the expected number of events at ti
can be obtained by summing the hazards over the population at risk:
E(di) =
X
j:tj>ti
hˆ0(ti) exp[xj ˆ].
where di is the number of events at ti and the sum is taken over the individuals j that are still
at risk at ti. Replacing the expected number of events E(di) by their actual number di gives
an estimation of hˆ0(ti).
4.1 Marriage Rate m(c)
Although family reconstitution data, which are centred around marriages, may seem at first to
be less than ideal for analysing people who never married, we can study lifetime celibacy by
analysing the life courses of the children from each marriage. By looking at cohorts of births,
we are able to compute the share of unmarried individuals by their age of death, providing a
full picture of celibacy across the entire lifecycle.
2We also ran other models with a greater number of time periods, one for each decade, but this did not
influence our results.
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Rather than following the literature so far by measuring celibacy among women surviving past
a certain age (say 40 or 50) (Weir 1984; Schofield 1985), we use Cox proportional hazard models
to measure the risk of marriage across the life course. This method thus accounts for women
who died before the cut o↵ age, married or not. Women’s risk of marriage begins when they
turn 16, the age at which women were allowed to marry according to Anglican tradition, and
was only censored at the upper end when the woman died. Thus, we exclude women who died
below the age of 16 and were never at risk of marriage.
To compute our indicator of celibacy, we take the predicted marriage rate from the estimated
survival function at the age of 45, which is m(c). We choose age 45 because very few marriages
occurred after age 45 and very few women were able to have children after the age of 45, so
marriages beyond 45 were unlikely to influence net fertility across social groups. In addition,
we impose the following requirements on the data to construct the sample used to predict the
survival curves: we count women in the data as married if they (i) were baptised and buried
in the sampled parish; (ii) survived beyond the age of 16 as mentioned above; and (iii) were
registered as being married or having baptised a child in the parish. Lifetime celibate women
satisfied conditions (i) and (ii) but were not registered as married or baptising children in the
parish.
Table A.2 in Appendix A provides information on the sample of women for whom we calculate
the marriage rate. There are a total of 9,007 women satisfying (i) and (ii), and 58.9 per cent
of them are registered as married, hence satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii).
Column (1) in Table 1 shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model estimating the
risk of marriage. Here we have reported coe cients, but to interpret the Cox model, it is often
helpful to calculate a hazard ratio by exponentiating the coe cient, similar to an odds ratio for
logistic regressions. The upper classes have a hazard ratio of 0.733 (e 0.310) which means that
they have a 36.3% lower risk of being married by the end of the period at risk than the reference
group of labourers and servants. Thus, daughters of the upper classes had substantially lower
risks of marriage, but daughters of craftsmen, traders and the unknown occupations were also
less likely to marry than the daughters of laborers and servants. The top left panel of Figure 3
shows the marriage rate across the social groups predicted from the survival curve at age 45
with average levels imputed for all parish and time dummies. As was clear from the regressions,
there is a social gradient in marriage rates. Poorer social groups were much more likely to marry
with marriage rates around 80 per cent, but the merchants/professionals and gentry had much
lower rates of marriage around 68 per cent. The farmers were a bit of an outlier (as they are in
some of the other calculations as well). Thus, we observe a strong social gradient in celibacy
with the richest experiencing much higher rates than the poorest.3
3The Cox proportional hazard model assumes, as its name indicates, that the hazard rate is shifted pro-
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time to time to time to
marriage first birth death
Occupations m(c) z(c) d(c)
(1) (2) (3)
Husbandmen  0.067  0.030  0.001
(0.065) (0.041) (0.039)
Craftsmen  0.204⇤⇤⇤  0.013 0.039
(0.063) (0.039) (0.036)
Traders  0.162⇤⇤  0.038 0.067
(0.079) (0.051) (0.046)
Farmers 0.119  0.203⇤⇤⇤ 0.004
(0.091) (0.062) (0.062)
Upper Class  0.310⇤⇤⇤  0.204⇤⇤⇤ 0.071
(0.086) (0.053) (0.048)
Unknown Occupation  0.097⇤  0.284⇤⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.052) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 9,007 14,730 48,514
Note: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies
and 4 period dummies are included. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model. Analysis of m(c), z(c), d(c)
4.2 Childlessness rate z(c)
In order to compute the rate of childlessness (i.e. the share of married couples who never have
a child), we again use Cox proportional hazard models to estimate the risk of a married couple
having a first birth. Couples become at risk of a first birth upon marriage and censoring occurs
when the mother dies.4 We take the predicted childlessness rate for each social group after ten
years as our indicator of childlessness in the net reproduction calculations.
We limit our sample to couples whose burial dates are known to ensure that we do not attribute
childlessness to couples that migrated out of the parish. As mentioned above, we also restrict
portionately by the control variables. It implies that the survival functions for di↵erent social classes change
proportionately and do not, for instance, cross each other. One test of the proportionality assumption (by
Grambsch and Therneau (1994)) is obtained by computing, for each control variable, the scaled Schoenfeld
residual, and by correlating it with a transformation of time (Hosmer Jr and Lemeshow, 1999, pp. 197-205;
Schoenfeld, 1982); proportionality is rejected if the correlation is statistically significant. In the case of our re-
gression, the correlations are respectively 0.01 (Husbandmen), 0.01 (Craftsmen), 0.00 (Traders), -0.02 (Farmers),
-0.00 (Upper class), and none of them is statistically di↵erent from zero.
4Note that childbirth outside of wedlock was banned by the Church of England, and that illegitimate births,
therefore, were rare ranging from 1.2 per cent to 6.0 per cent of births across our period (Wrigley et al., 1997,
p. 224).
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the sample to first marriages in the calculations of z(c) and b(c) for a number of reasons. First,
we want to avoid double counting of mothers and fathers who may have been childless in the
second marriage but not the first. Second, we want to eliminate age e↵ects on sterility in second
marriages since the average age of women in second marriages was substantially higher: the
intervals between first and second marriages for women were 43.7 months across the period
(Wrigley et al., 1997, p. 172). There is also a lot of uncertainty about the marriage order
of many people in our dataset since we cannot know whether an individual who migrated
into a parish was married previously. The data often only state that the marriage order was
greater than or equal to the first or greater than or equal to the second. Finally, Wrigley
et al. (1997) argue that it is impossible to know the precise rates of remarriage from family
reconstitution data because second marriages can only be identified by linking to a birth record.
Thus, the di↵erential propensity to link di↵erent types of individuals leads to bachelor/spinster
marriages being overrepresented and the other marriage types being underrepresented (Wrigley
et al., 1997, p. 164). However, it is impossible to correct for this without a full census of the
population with marriage orders, which does not exist for our data. To test the prevalence
of remarriage across the social groups, we assume that the marriage order was the lowest
possible order listed, i.e. we assume that in-migrants’ marriages were first marriages, and look
at the mean marriage order of men and women across our occupational groups (see Table B.4).
Although men have higher marriage orders than women, the mean marriage order is very stable
across the occupational groups and is unlikely to a↵ect our results for calculating z(c) or b(c).
Table A.3 shows that out of 14,730 women in the sample, 15 per cent remained childless. This
is a very high number compared to the usual estimations of natural sterility,5 but below the
childlessness rate of the nobles reported in Hollingsworth (1965).
Specification (2) in Table 1 shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model estimating
the risk of a married couple having a first child. A social gradient is again clear with richer
social groups having significantly lower risks of a first birth, which implies higher rates of
childlessness.6
The top right panel of Figure 3 shows the predicted childlessness rate at ten years after marriage
5Leridon (2008) measures natural sterility in the Henry database for rural eighteeth-century France when
fertility control was ine↵ective. Restricting the sample to couples where the husband and the wife were still
living together at age 50, 3.7 per cent of women who married at age 20-24 remained childless.
6We also test here for proportionality. The correlation between the scaled Schoenfeld residual and trans-
formation of time are respectively 0.01 (Husbandmen), 0.00 (Craftsmen), 0.01 (Traders), 0.00 (Farmers), 0.03
(Upper class), and none of them is statistically di↵erent from zero, but for the Upper class. In addition to
the proportionality assumption, it is also possible to test the assumption of the Cox model that censoring is
independent from survival time. We have reasons to believe that it might be violated in the case of childlessness,
as sterility and death have common unobserved determinants. We consider this issue in Appendix F, using the
method proposed by Jackson et al. (2014) and find that it is not important for our results.
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Figure 3: Computed Margins Across Social Groups
across social groups (with average levels for parish and time period dummies) and highlights
again the strong social gradient in childlessness similar to celibacy. Marriages in wealthier social
groups were more likely to remain childless relative to the poor. These rates of childlessness
are rather high, so they are discussed in more detail in Section 6.
4.3 Marital fertility rate b(c)
We calculate marital fertility conditional on having a child by again using Cox proportional
hazard models to predict parity progression ratios, Pn. Pn is the risk that a couple has an
additional child conditional on having reached a given parity n and is given as follows:
Pn = P (n+ 1|n) (3)
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At parity zero, this is the opposite to the childless, z(c), calculated above. At parity one,
we measure the risk that a couple will have a second child conditional on them having had
a first child. The period at risk begins at the birth of the first child and the event is closed
when a second child is born. Right censoring occurs when the mother dies. Again we limit
the sample to couples where the burial dates are observed for both the mother and father and
to first marriages. We predict the parity progression ratios from the survival curves ten years
after the previous birth. Table A.5 shows the characteristics of the sample used to predict the
parity progression ratios. The first line shows the number of couples at risk for a second birth
conditional on having a first birth. Of the 12,519 at risk of a second birth, 85.8 per cent had a
second birth. The percentage of couples having an additional child declines with parity as we
would expect.
Table 2 shows the coe cients of Cox regressions modelling the probability to move to the next
parity conditionally on having one to nine children. We stop the estimation at P (10|9) because
after parity ten the sample size becomes too small. Here we see that the upper classes have
higher probabilities to have an additional child, in particular when they already have three.7
Table B.2 in Appendix shows the predicted parity progression ratios for various social groups
from the regressions of Table 2 assuming average levels for parish and time period dummies.
Lower parity progression ratios across the parities will produce a lower gross fertility rate for
the social group. Thus, at first glance there appears to be a social gradient with richer groups
having higher fertility. Following Henry (1953, chapter 14) and Feeney (1986), these parity
progression ratios can be used to calculate the completed fertility using the following formula:
Mothers’ Completed Fertility = 1 + P1
✓
1 + P2
✓
1 + P3 . . .
✓
1 +
Pn
1  Pn
◆◆◆
(4)
However, we are interested in the fertility of incomplete families as well, so we have added
survival probabilities to equation (4). In order to do this, we use logistic regression to estimate
the probability that a mother will die before the birth of her next child (at parity n + 1)
conditional on her having had a child of parity n, which we take to be within five years of the
previous birth. There are not significant di↵erences across social groups in this measure (see
Table B.1 in Appendix B), but we feel that it is necessary for completeness. Thus, we can add
the survival probabilities sn to the completed fertility equation above to calculate the gross
7The proportionality of the hazard rates is less clearly supported for the birth estimations than for the
two extensive margins. Among the 63 coe cients in Table 4, proportionality is rejected in 26 cases (at the
5% level). However, this non-proportionality is not overly concerning because we are estimating the parity
progression ratios over a short period of time (the cumulated hazard over ten years rather than 30 years for
marriage rates), and non-proportionality is less likely to be an issue over short time intervals (Bellera et al.
2010).
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time to time to time to time to time to
Occupations second child third child fourth child fifth child sixth child
Husbandmen 0.099⇤⇤ 0.070 0.051 0.087 0.049
(0.044) (0.048) (0.053) (0.060) (0.070)
Craftsmen 0.126⇤⇤⇤ 0.047 0.100⇤⇤ 0.166⇤⇤⇤ 0.149⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.046) (0.050) (0.056) (0.064)
Traders 0.182⇤⇤⇤ 0.166⇤⇤⇤ 0.231⇤⇤⇤ 0.280⇤⇤⇤  0.014
(0.055) (0.059) (0.064) (0.072) (0.084)
Farmers 0.196⇤⇤⇤ 0.117⇤ 0.164⇤⇤ 0.043  0.032
(0.065) (0.069) (0.075) (0.085) (0.100)
Upper Class 0.197⇤⇤⇤ 0.180⇤⇤⇤ 0.254⇤⇤⇤ 0.183⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤
(0.057) (0.061) (0.066) (0.074) (0.085)
Unknown Occupation  0.070⇤⇤  0.102⇤⇤⇤  0.056  0.018  0.029
(0.035) (0.038) (0.042) (0.048) (0.056)
Observations 12,519 10,738 8,993 7,280 5,679
time to time to time to time to
Occupations seventh child eighth child nineth child tenth child
Husbandmen  0.067 0.103 0.216  0.049
(0.083) (0.100) (0.132) (0.186)
Craftsmen 0.023 0.007 0.270⇤⇤ 0.049
(0.075) (0.092) (0.119) (0.159)
Traders 0.234⇤⇤  0.082 0.308⇤⇤ 0.325⇤
(0.096) (0.122) (0.153) (0.197)
Farmers 0.110 0.069  0.055  0.288
(0.115) (0.142) (0.198) (0.294)
Upper Class 0.265⇤⇤⇤ 0.300⇤⇤ 0.551⇤⇤⇤  0.070
(0.098) (0.117) (0.143) (0.197)
Unknown Occupation  0.068 0.076 0.213⇤⇤  0.116
(0.067) (0.081) (0.106) (0.146)
Observations 4,201 2,959 1,932 1,154
Notes: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies and 4 period dummies are included.
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 2: Cox Analysis of Parity Progression Across Social Groups
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fertility of women in the sample using the following equation:
b(c) = s0
✓
1 + s1P1
✓
1 + s2P2
✓
1 + s3P3 . . .
✓
1 +
snPn
1  snPn
◆◆◆◆
(5)
The bottom left panel of Figure 3 shows the final values of b(c) for each social group calculated
from equation 5. There is again a social gradient, which in this case mirrors the survival of
the richest results found in the previous literature. The richer social groups had substantially
higher fertility than the poorer ones, excepting the farmers. This could be driven by a number
of factors, but the more common use of wet nurses among the upper classes may explain some of
the di↵erential (Fildes 1986, pp. 99-100). Thus, the intensive and extensive margin of fertility
seem to be influencing net fertility in opposite directions across social groups.
4.4 Child mortality rate d(c)
Child mortality is also calculated using a Cox proportional hazard model. Exposure for children
begins from birth, events are closed if a child dies and right censoring occurs after age 15 since
we are only interested in survival to marriage age. To estimate the model, we must observe the
child’s birth year and their mother’s year of death. In addition, we require that the mother’s
year of death is 15 years after the child’s birth. This requirement ensures that all of the child’s
mortality exposure was in the observed parish since the father may have moved the family after
the mother’s death. Children who we do not observe dying are assumed to have survived to age
15. We take the predicted mortality rate from the survival curve at age 15. Table A.4 shows
the characteristics of the sample used to estimate child deaths. Of the 48,514 children at risk
in the sample, we have a death rate of 26.0 per cent.
Specification (3) in Table 1 shows that there is no significant social gradient in child mortality.
All of the coe cients are insignificant and very close to zero.8 Thus, di↵erences in net fertility
across groups do not seem to be related to di↵erences in relative survival of the rich and poor.
4.5 Social Gradients in Reproductive Success
Having estimated class gradients across the four margins of fertility, we now combine them and
calculate the net reproduction for each social group. We calculate two measures of net fertility.
n incorporates all four margins of fertility whereas n¯ applies the average values of the extensive
margin to calculate the net reproduction rate as shown in the following equation:
n¯(c) = m¯ (1  z¯) b(c) (1  d(c)) (6)
8Moreover, the proportionality of hazards is never rejected.
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Figure 4: Net reproduction rates Across Social Groups
Figure 4 plots n(c) and n¯(c) across the social groups. Looking first at n¯(c), the light grey line, we
see the pattern commonly reported in the literature. The richer group has substantially higher
net reproduction rates than the poorer groups, confirming the survival of the richest story.
Farmers had lower reproduction rates, but otherwise the social gradient is clear. However,
when we include the extensive margins of celibacy and childlessness (the dark grey line), we
see that the gradient changes dramatically. The net fertility rates of the upper classes decrease
substantially because they have high rates of celibacy and childlessness whereas the net fertility
of the poor increases substantially because they have low rates of celibacy and childlessness.
The di↵erences between n(c) and n¯(c) are statistically significant at the five per cent level for
the upper classes and labourers and servants. The di↵erences for farmers and husbandmen just
barely miss the ten per cent threshold, whereas there are no signficant di↵erences between n(c)
and n¯(c) for craftsmen and traders as one might expect.9 Thus, rather than seeing a more or
less smooth increasing gradient in net reproduction across social groups, we see a hump-shaped
pattern with the middle classes of traders and farmers having the highest net reproduction
rates. This raises serious doubts about previous claims attributing an evolutionary advantage
to the wealthiest classes in early modern English society.
4.6 Uncertainty Surrounding the Estimates
The uncertainty surrounding each margin, m(c), z(c) and d(c), is given by the standard errors
of the estimated coe cients of the Cox regressions provided in Tables 1 and 2. To show the
9We use the imputation method described in the next section (section 4.6) to aggregate the uncertainty
around the estimates for the four margins estimated above.
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uncertainty around the more complex measures b(c) and n(c), given by Equations (1) and (5)
respectively, we need to rely on simulations. We therefore generate a sample of moments m(c),
z(c), d(c) and parity progressions Pn, by drawing them from their estimated distribution (using
the mean and standard error of the estimated survival, assuming they are normally distributed
and uncorrelated). With these moments we can compute a sample of mothers’ fertility b(c)
and, finally, a sample of reproduction rates n(c). More details are provided in Appendix D.
These samples allow us to test whether net reproduction rates are statistically significant be-
tween social classes. We have aggregated the social classes as follows: the lower class includes
Labourers, Servants, Husbandmen, and Craftsmen and the middle class includes Traders and
Farmers. We find that the middle classes had a statistically signficant (one-tailed p-value=0.04)
advantage in net reproduction of 0.23 children over the upper classes. However, the di↵erences
between the other groups were statistically less clear. The middle classes had 0.14 higher net
reproduction than the lower classes, but this di↵erence was not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels (one-tailed p-value=0.11). The di↵erence between the upper and lower classes
was even smaller, with the lower classes having 0.09 more children, but again this di↵erence
was not statistically significant (one-tailed p-value=0.21). Thus, although we cannot be to-
tally certain of all of the mean di↵erences, the net reproduction of the middle classes was very
likely substantially higher than the upper classes.10 This finding clearly di↵ers from the earlier
literature.
These results could be biased if fertility of the upper classes began declining at the end of the
eighteenth century as both Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and Weisdorf (2011) and Clark and Cummins
(2015) found in earlier studies. Although we include time dummies in our regressions, these are
not interacted with the social groups, so they cannot capture di↵erences in the margins across
time for each social group. Thus, to see whether our baseline estimation is sensitive to including
these marriages late in our period, and whether Clark and Cummins (2015) results can be seen
as one possible realization of our model, we have redone our entire analysis excluding marriages
that occurred after 1780. Appendix E reports these results and shows that they have little
e↵ect on the social gradient of female net reproduction. In fact, the di↵erences between the
groups become more significant. Despite the fact that the standard errors increase with the
restricted sample, farmers have higher net reproduction driving the middle-class level upwards.
10One might also wonder what would happen if those with unknown occupations were able to be assigned to
their correct occupational categories. The unknown category has lower net reproduction than the other groups.
Part of this is driven by the sources of occupations, which leads us to underestimate births and overestimate
childlessness for that group, and is discussed at length in Section 5.3 and Appendix I. If we assume that the
vast majority of the unknown were lower classes and reallocate all of the unknown into the lower class category,
the net reproduction of the lower classes becomes statistically lower than both the middle and upper classes.
However, the middle classes would still have far higher fertility than the upper classes, which is what is important
for our story. The hump-shaped gradient would only become more accentuated.
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Thus, in this robustness check, the di↵erences in net reproduction between the middle class and
upper class on the one hand and middle class and lower class on the other are both statistically
significant with one-tailed p-values of 0.03 and 0.05 respectively. However, there is still no
significant di↵erence between the upper and lower classes (p-value=0.28). Again, we are not
able to confirm the gradient produced in the survival of the richest literature.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Migration and Selection
Any analysis of family reconstitution data faces the problem that people who migrate to or
from observed parishes are censored with regards to certain information. In the English data
there is no foolproof way of measuring migration since the English parish register system did
not include migration lists like the ones kept in Sweden (Jeub 1993). This makes it di cult to
calculate precise periods of exposure for each individual in the parish and is a limitation that
applies equally to the fertility and mortality calculations in Wrigley et al. (1997).11 However,
we do observe migration of a type because we know whether someone was baptised, married
or buried in the parish. Thus, we might not observe the baptism date of in-migrants, but we
are likely to observe their marriage, the baptism of their children or their burial. For out-
migrants, we would observe their baptism and perhaps their marriage but not their burial.
These three vital events provide important information that can be incorporated in defining
exposure periods. For instance, there is no problem in measuring marital fertility if we observe
a woman’s marriage date, the baptism dates of her children and her burial date since she is very
likely to have spent her reproductive years in the parish. Childlessness and child mortality are
similarly easy to measure. However, it is important to note that we can only calculate these
figures for non-migrants and in-migrants and must exclude out-migrants since we cannot be
sure they baptised all of their children in the parish.
We run into more trouble when trying to measure celibacy rates in the data. As mentioned
above, we observe never-married (celibate) individuals based on three criteria: they were bap-
tised and buried in the parish; they survived past the age of 15; and they never married nor
baptised or buried any children in the parish. These three components ensure that we have
identified someone who never married and did not have any illegitimate children. Because we
need to observe both the baptism and burial date of an individual, to measure celibacy we have
to exclude both out-migrants and in-migrants from the calculations. Thus, because we must
exclude some form of migrants from all of the calculations, it is important to try to establish
11Ruggles (1992) and Wrigley (1994) have also discussed potential migration biases to mean ages at marriage
and death in reconstitution studies. These are discussed in more detail in Appendix G.
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that the selection bias of migrants is not driving our primary results, i.e. class-gradients in the
four margins.
Before conducting some empirical tests, it might be helpful to describe who the out- and in-
migrants were. Migrants in early modern England could have been one of three types. The first
type were people who did not move very far, for instance to a nearby parish. These migrants
were likely taking advantage of new economic opportunities such as employment as a servant
in a di↵erent parish but did not substantially vary their cultural practices (Anderson, 1990,
p. 11). These migrants were not insubstantial. Clark (1979) studied the migration patterns
of rural witnesses in diocesan courts between 1660 and 1730 finding that 70% had moved at
least once in their life. However, only 14% had moved beyond their county of origin. Likewise,
Anderson (1990) found that two-thirds of rural migrants in 1851 moved less than 25 km. This
evidence from 1851 is especially striking since migration had increased substantially by this
period driven by the growth of industrial cities (Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley 2014). In our data,
we can capture the demographic behaviour of this type of migrant by looking at in-migrants to
our own parishes, who are likely similar to out-migrants from our parishes who also moved to
similar parishes.
The second type of migrants were people who left home to become apprentices and learn a trade.
Minns and Wallis (2012) estimate that in 1700 around 9 per cent of English young men were
apprenticed in London alone and 60 per cent of these apprentices were in-migrants to London.
The London apprenticeship market was remarkably open with the majority of apprentices being
unrelated to their master by kinship or place of origin and drawn from nearly all of England
(de la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr 2018), though with a clear gradient based on distance to
London. Apprentices came from all social backgrounds but the sons of gentlemen, professionals,
traders and craftsmen were over-represented among London apprentices relative to labourers,
servants, husbandmen and farmers (Leunig, Minns, and Wallis 2011). Thus, apprentices may
account for more migration among the higher and middle classes compared to the lower classes,
excluding farmers. One should also note that a large minority of these apprentices returned
to their original parish after their apprenticeship, so not all of these migrants were lost from
observation forever (Klemp et al. 2013).
The third type of migrants were people who moved from our provincial parishes to towns or
larger population centres, London being the largest draw, but did not take part in formal
apprenticeships. We do not have precise information on rural to urban migration until the
mid-nineteenth century with the census of 1851. This data is an imperfect proxy for our earlier
period because of the enormous population growth and urbanisation that occurred in England
along with the Industrial Revolution, so we must interpret the findings cautiously. According
to a national sample analysed by Anderson (1990), 54% of the population lived more than 2
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km from their place of birth. While only one-third of rural migrants moved more than 25 km,
the percentages urban migrants moving more than 25 km were much higher: around 60% of
urban migrants to provincial cities and 80% of migrants to London (Anderson, 1990, pp. 11-
12). Thus, as expected urban migrants travelled longer distances than rural migrants, though
this is for a much later period. Another long-standing feature of urban migration was the
extremely high death rates of migrants in their new urban environment. Death rates in London
were astoundingly high in the seventeenth century even as the population of London doubled
across the century (Landers, 1993, pp. 193-195; Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley, 2014, p. 76). High
mortality meant that many of the urban migrants would not have survived to reproduce anyway.
Keeping these three types of migrants in mind, we can now discuss how selective migration
might influence our results. We will begin by discussing our celibacy calculation from which we
have to exclude both in- and out-migrants. It is highly possible that some women permanently
left their parish of origin and never married or had children. However, this would only distort
our estimation of the celibacy margin across social groups if there were (i) di↵erent migration
rates for women across the social groups or if (ii) the women migrating from a particular
social group were more likely to remain celibate than women migrating from another group.
On the first point, we test whether there were significant di↵erences in out-migration rates
by class. To do this, we have to categorise individuals by their father’s occupation since we
are unable to observe the occupation of out-migrants at marriage. Table 3 illustrates two
main features of early modern migration: women were slightly more likely to emigrate than
men and the social gradient was largely flat for women and slightly decreasing for men. These
gradients are confirmed by linear probability models reported in the last two columns of Table 3.
The results suggest that the propensity to emigrate was statistically higher for male o↵spring
born to labourers and servants than for o↵spring of more well-o↵ families, but there were no
statistically significant di↵erences in emigration rates of female o↵spring (with the exception of
the less mobile daughters of craftsmen). This conclusion is reassuring for our analysis of female
fertility but is a constraint for our analysis of men’s net reproduction in Appendix H.
Unfortunately, it is much more di cult to deal with the second issue above. We have no
way of formally testing whether migrant women from di↵erent classes had the same or di↵erent
propensities to be celibate or marry. We simply have to assume that celibate women’s propensity
to migrate was equal (or proportionally equal) to the propensities of non-migrants and conduct
the analysis as such. This is a strong assumption, though, so we provide additional empirical
and historical analysis to support it.
The largest potential problem for migration on our marriage rates would be if migrants from
the upper classes, which have low marriage rates, had a higher propensity to marry than non-
migrants from the same group. One might assume that wealthier women were more likely
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Emigration rates Linear Probability Model
Son of Daughter of Son of Daughter of
Labourers & Servants 58.5% 60.4% Reference group
Husbandmen 53.1% 58.1%  0.021⇤⇤  0.001
(0.008) (0.009)
Craftsmen 52.8% 57.5%  0.043⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤
(0.008) (0.008)
Traders 56.1% 60.0%  0.033⇤⇤⇤  0.013
(0.010) (0.010)
Farmers 54.2% 61.6%  0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.013) (0.013)
Merchants & Professionals 53.6% 57.0%  0.034⇤⇤⇤  0.019
(0.013) (0.013)
Gentry 46.7% 56.8%  0.054⇤⇤⇤ 0.008
(0.018) (0.018)
Unknown Occupation 53.5% 57.0%  0.011  0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 65,183 62,453
Note: The linear probability model includes 26 parish dummies and 4 period dummies.
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
Table 3: Emigration by Social Group
to migrate for marriage since they had a smaller pool of eligible bachelors locally, had more
money to search for potential partners and would have benefited more from their husband’s
inheritance. This would mean that our low marriage rates for the upper classes are potentially
under-estimates. We can apply an approximate test for this by looking at in-migrants into
our own parishes who would have been similar to migrants to rural areas and market towns
in the same period. If wealthy women were more likely to migrate and marry at the same
time, we would expect to observe that the wealthy had higher shares of marriages between
female in-migrants and male non-migrants than other social groups. In addition, the share of
marriages between female in-migrants and male non-migrants would be higher than the share
of marriages between male in-migrants and female non-migrants in these wealthier groups.
However, as Table 4 shows, we do not observe this pattern at all. Merchants and professionals
had the lowest share of female in-migrant marriages, and although the gentry had a higher share,
it was below that of husbandmen, traders and farmers. The share of gentry marriages with in-
migrant mothers was only slightly higher than the share of marriages with in-migrant fathers.
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For merchants and professionals in-migrant fathers made up a larger share of marriages. Thus,
it does not seem that upper class women had a higher propensity to marry when migrating.
The largest di↵erence between the share of in-migrant mother and in-migrant father marriages,
at 16 percentage points, was among farmers who had the lowest share of in-migrant fathers
and highest share of in-migrant mothers. These figures suggest that it is possible that out-
migrant farmers’ daughters could have had a higher propensity to marry than those who did not
migrate. However, farmers had the highest marriage rates and second highest net reproduction
rates in our sample. Thus, this bias would only increase their advantage over the merchants,
professionals and gentry rather than eliminating our social gradient in net reproduction.
Occupation Share of marriages Share of marriages
betw. in-migrant Mothers betw. non-migrant Mothers
and non-migrant Fathers and in-migrant Fathers
Labourers and Servants 0.190 0.180
Husbandmen 0.252 0.146
Craftsmen 0.221 0.188
Traders 0.233 0.153
Farmers 0.271 0.111
Merchants and Professionals 0.134 0.182
Gentry 0.232 0.205
Unknown 0.218 0.184
Total 0.218 0.177
Note: Household occupation is the husband’s occupation.
Table 4: Share of marriages by migrant status
In addition to our analysis of in-migrants, historical research on never-married women highlights
the importance of kinship ties to single women’s welfare across all classes in society, which
may suggest that never-married women had a lower propensity to migrate than their married
counterparts (Froide, 2005, p. 49). Thus, in the end we believe it is reasonable to analyse
celibacy rates across the social groups from the reconstitution data.
When thinking about the other margins of reproductive success, we can begin to understand
how migration would influence our results by comparing di↵erences in the other margins be-
tween in-migrants and non-migrants. This comparison helps us understand the demographic
characteristics of the first type of migrants, migrants who did not move very far, highlighted
above. Appendix G provides the details of these calculations, which follow a similar format
to the general estimations conducted above. We test for di↵erences between families with in-
migrant mothers, in-migrant fathers and where both parents were in-migrants. The relative
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prevalence of these types of marriages across the social groups is given in Table B.5. We find
some relatively minor di↵erences between in-migrants and non-migrants, but there was no sig-
nificant social gradient in these e↵ects. Thus, excluding migrants from our analysis is unlikely
to influence our main results.
5.2 Net Reproduction for Men
As mentioned above, our baseline fertility calculations centred on women’s fertility because
this is the most common way fertility is measured among demographers. However, this may
limit the comparability of our study to Clark and Hamilton (2006) and Clark and Cummins
(2015) since these papers focused on the fertility recorded in wills, which mainly refer to men.
Thus, we provide a robustness check in Appendix H that presents our results recalculated for
male fertility. Male net reproduction was higher than female net reproduction across all social
groups largely because b(c) was higher for men in general (Figure H.5). When holding the
extensive margin constant at the average level across the various social groups, we again see
that the rich had much higher net reproduction than the poor (see Figure H.4), though the
di↵erences between rich and poor are much smaller than those found by Clark and Hamilton
(2006). However, once the extensive margin of fertility is allowed to vary across social groups,
the inverse u-shaped pattern that we found for women remains. Upper class men had a rate
of net reproduction far below that of their middle and even lower-class counterparts. The
result among the upper classes was mainly driven by lower marriage rates and higher rates of
childlessness.
5.3 Sources of Male Occupations
Another potential source of error for our childlessness and marital fertility rates comes from
the sources of male occupations. These rates could be skewed if the sources of occupations,
from marriages, baptisms, or deaths, were significantly di↵erent across social groups. In fact,
a large proportion of our occupational data comes from baptism records, which would only
be recorded for individuals who were not childless. This may explain the significantly higher
rate of childlessness among those with an unknown occupation. In order to test whether this
was the case, we restricted our baseline analysis to father’s occupations that were drawn from
marriage or burial registers and moved those from baptism registers into the unknown occupa-
tion category. The results for childlessness are reported in Appendix I, Table I.2. Removing
the baptism occupations, reduces the slope of the gradient of childlessness across social groups
and the di↵erences between groups become insignificant because of the smaller sample size, but
the higher levels of childlessness among farmers and the upper classes remain. We perform a
similar robustness check for marital fertility rates and find that the slightly lower fertility of
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the unknown occupation group was also partly a product of the greater propensity to observe
a father’s occupation if he had more children (see Figure I.2). We recalculate the final net
reproduction rates in Figure I.3. This adjustment reduces the net reproduction rate for the
lower classes by increasing childlessness and decreasing marital fertility, but the general pattern
that we find in our baseline holds. The upper classes did not have higher net reproduction rates
than the lower classes. It was the middle classes of traders and farmers that had the highest
net reproduction.
6 Discussion of the results
As was reported earlier, we find that incorporating the extensive margins of fertility shifts
our understanding of the reproductive success of di↵erent socio-economic groups significantly.
Our analysis showed that the lower, middle and upper classes operated by means of distinctly
di↵erent demographic regimes. Although the families of all three classes married comparatively
late in life on average (Table B.3 in Appendix B), the upper classes were more often unmarried
or childless than the rest (top panels of Figure 3). This resulted in comparatively modest
rates of reproduction among the upper classes (Figure 4). Similarly, the lower classes had lower
rates of reproduction than their middle-class counterparts, but their lower net reproduction was
caused by fewer births within marriage rather than fertility control on the extensive margin
(Bottom left panel of Figure 3). Among middle-class families, however, birth limitation did not
occur to the same extent as in upper- and lower-class families. Farmers tended to marry at
higher rates, although they had fewer births on average than the upper classes. Traders had as
many births on average as the upper classes, but had lower rates of childlessness. These socio-
specific combinations ultimately gave the middle class the upper hand in the grand scheme of
reproductive success (Figure 4).
This general overview raises two sets of questions about our findings. First, what explains
class di↵erentials in childlessness? For many of the social gradients above, it is fairly easy
to understand how they could emerge across the di↵erent groups. Marriage rates could be
influenced by cultural practices and requirements to save enough resources before marriage.
Sibship size could be influenced by di↵ering mean ages at marriage and birth spacing across the
groups. However, it is slightly more di cult to explain variations in childlessness across groups.
In a time before e↵ective contraception, it was di cult for couples who were sexually active to
avoid pregnancy over a long marriage. Thus, we will look at potential mechanisms behind our
childlessness findings to help explain variations in this margin. Second, how do these findings
relate to earlier studies attributing pre-Industrial economic development in North-West Europe
to the European Marriage Pattern? Our study allows us to look at the functioning of the
EMP within a society and speculate about how these structures may have influenced economic
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growth.
6.1 Possible Reasons for High Childlessness
One of the more puzzling findings presented above was the strong variations in childlessness by
social group. Thus, in this section we will consider a number of potential explanations for the
social gradient in childlessness in turn, though our analysis does not allow us to fully identify
the causal pathway running from higher social status to higher childlessness.
First, Wrigley et al. (1997, pp. 394-8) argue that the most important variable influencing entry
sterility (or the inability to produce any child in a marriage) was the mother’s age at marriage.
Thus, if women in higher social groups married systematically later than their lower social
group peers, then we would expect to see a higher rate of childlessness. However, this cannot
explain the higher childlessness rates among merchants and professionals and the gentry since
they had similar mean ages of marriage to some of the other social groups (Table B.3).
Second, Gobbi and Gon˜i (2016) suggest that inheritance practices may have influenced whether
couples remained childless. Before the twentieth century, the English nobility used marriage
settlements to pass land and wealth to their heir. Marriage settlements set up a trust where the
bride and groom were only life tenants to their estate and the estate was passed on unbroken
to the heir of their marriage. Marriage settlements were instigated at the marriage of an heir
(alternatively, settlements could be signed when the heir turn 21) and provided for the heir’s
younger brothers and sisters, e↵ectively preventing the estate from being broken apart. They
had to be renewed every generation. Studying the British peerage between 1603 and 1938,
Gobbi and Gon˜i found that the rates of childlessness among heirs without marriage settlements
were 8 to 13 per cent higher than rates among heirs with marriage settlements. Because the
estates of heirs without marriage settlements could be sold on the market, these heirs chose to
remain childless rather than pass on a smaller estate to their son and heir. An heir would not
have a marriage settlement if his father died before his marriage, which occurred in 23.6 per
cent of cases in Gobbi and Gon˜i’s dataset. Thus, this inheritance structure, which would have
influenced the gentry most strongly, could have contributed to higher childlessness rates among
higher wealth groups in our data.
It is also possible that higher rates of venereal diseases such as gonorrhoea, chlamydia and
syphilis among the upper classes led to higher rates of sterility. Gonorrhoea and chlamydia lead
to infertility by preventing conception since both diseases if untreated lead to blockages of the
Fallopian tubes and abnormal sperm, whereas syphilis causes higher rates of miscarriages and
stillbirths (Belsey, 1976, pp. 327-29). There is anecdotal evidence that some of these diseases
were prevalent among the gentry and aristocracy, e.g. Henry VIII had syphilis (Parascandola
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2008) and James Boswell, a high-born Scottish lawyer, had at least 17 infections of gonorrhoea
in his life (Stone, 1979, p. 350). However, it is much more di cult to find prevalence estimates
for the general population. Szreter (2017) found that in the 1770s 8 per cent of residents in
Cheshire had contracted syphilis by the age of 35, but the prevalence rate was much lower at
1 per cent in Cheshire’s rural hinterlands similar to most of the parishes in the reconstitution
dataset. There is no systematic information about class gradients in syphilis prevalence until
the early twentieth century when syphilis was most common among unskilled working-class men
(Szreter, 2014) and therefore would not explain higher rates of childlessness among the upper
classes. Prevalence rates of gonorrhoea and chlamydia were likely higher than for syphilis, but
again we have no way of knowing whether these also produced a class gradient.
Gon˜i (2015) has also argued that consanguinity could have influenced childlessness. Again,
studying the British peerage, now in the nineteenth century, he found that children of con-
sanguineous marriages (between second cousins or closer) were 50 per cent more likely to be
childless than children of peers who did not marry in the same family. Thus, if members of the
gentry were more likely to marry individuals closely related to them, this could explain part of
the di↵erence in childlessness that we observe.
Finally, it is possible that the unique cultural context of marriage among the gentry led to higher
levels of childlessness. Since members of the wealthier classes had less control over who they
married, they may have ended up in loveless marriages at a higher rate than their counterparts
down the social ladder (Stone, 1979, p. 308). If their rates of sexual activity were lower, then
this might increase rates of childlessness enough to reflect the di↵erences we have observed.
6.2 The European Marriage Pattern and Economic Growth
Our study makes two important contributions to the debate on the foundations of North-West
European economic success. First, it suggests that voluntary childlessness may have been
an important mechanism within the European Marriage pattern. Second, we argue that the
class-specific demographic patterns in England were particularly conducive to its industrial
development during and after the classical years of the Industrial Revolution. Rather than
survival of the richest, the higher reproductive success of the middle classes ensured that those
most likely to invest in the human capital of their children outgrew other groups.
Traditionally, scholars held that births could only be limited by raising the age of marriage
or increasing the celibacy rate (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981; Weir, 1984). We depart from
the view inherent in these previous approaches by highlighting the importance of voluntary
childlessness as a fertility limitation strategy. Our data suggest that this fertility mechanism
was more prominent among the upper classes in early modern England with the lower classes
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managing their fertility by adjusting birth spacing (c.f. Cinnirella, Klemp, and Weisdorf 2017;
Bengtsson and Dribe 2006). Thus, future studies of the European Marriage pattern should work
to incorporate childlessness as potential mechanisms through which population can adjust to
changes in living standards.
Our results also highlight how the class-specific demographic patterns would be helpful for
England’s economic growth. If middle-class families were the most reproductively successful
and also more prone to invest in growth-promoting education of their o↵spring, then their
reproductive success could create a growing pool of human capital in a society. Lower-class
families were rarely able to a↵ord even primary education let alone advanced education such as
apprenticeships (Minns and Wallis, 2012). On the other hand, while upper-class families were
able to a↵ord to pay for growth-enhancing education and sent some of their younger sons into
apprenticeships, elder sons were mainly trained to take over their family’s estates and did not
need growth-promoting educational training: they relied on the rental income of their estates
and had no incentive to participate in activities that fostered economic growth (Doepke and
Zilibotti 2008; Wallis and Webb 2011). Crouzet’s famous study of the social background of
the emerging class of English industrialists confirms this view, showing that less than three per
cent of the new industrialists had an upper-class origin (Crouzet 1985). Rather, 85 per cent of
industrialists came from a middle-class background. More than 40 per cent were involved in
an industrial trade that was similar to that of their father and 22 per cent had a father who
was a farmer. It was the children of the middle-classes that helped drive England’s industrial
development, not those of the upper or lower classes.
This pattern of human capital investment emphasises how Hajnal’s European Marriage Pattern
might have been conducive to economic growth in the case of England: not because all English
families universally strove to limit births, but because those classes that invested comparatively
little in growth-promoting education were more inclined to engage in birth restricting practises.
In the English case, the survival of the richest was therefore not a growth-promoting strategy:
the survival of the middle-classes was.
7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that when accounting for both the extensive and intensive margins of
fertility, the previous findings that the rich in early modern England had the highest repro-
ductive success disappears. Although merchants, professionals and gentry had the highest net
marital fertility, as a group they were more likely to remain celibate or childless once they
were married. After accounting for the extensive margin, we find that the middle classes had
the reproductive advantage. They had lower rates of celibacy and childlessness and therefore
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produced more o↵spring as a whole. Their reproductive success likely influenced England’s own
economic success in the early modern period by boosting investments in human capital. As
mentioned above, our social groups are imperfectly correlated with wealth, limiting our ability
to fully refute the earlier survival of the richest literature. However, we argue that our social
groups better capture groups within society who would invest in the human capital of their
children. This was the middle classes who were usually not the wealthiest in society.
This research has two sets of important implications. First, it raises questions about simple
models of the European Marriage Pattern. According to our findings di↵erent social groups
within early modern societies had substantially di↵erent family and demographic patterns:
celibacy and childlessness were the important fertility margins for the rich, and marital fertility
was the important margin for the poor. These class di↵erences raise questions about the useful-
ness of a simple model that classifies entire countries into those with strong or weak European
marriage patterns (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014). Thus, we must develop more dynamic models
of the European marriage pattern that allow for intra-country variation in the pattern and that
more properly account for change over time.
Second, our paper highlights the importance of the extensive margin of fertility in early modern
societies and corroborates more modern studies that have shown that fertility decisions on the
extensive margin have significantly influenced overall fertility (Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder
(2014); Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2015)). Future studies should focus more closely
on the dynamics of childlessness and celibacy. For instance, there is no study to date that
addresses all potential causes of childlessness in pre-Industrial societies including the voluntary
aspects highlighted in the most recent literature. Scholars have already challenged some of the
other fundamental assumptions underpinning the Malthusian preventive check: there is now
ample evidence that pre-Industrial couples could control their fertility within marriage and that
infanticide could operate as a separate control on fertility (Cinnirella, Klemp, and Weisdorf
2017; Bengtsson and Dribe 2006; Lee, Feng, and Li 2000). We must now explore childlessness
in a similar manner to see whether it is responsive to changing economic conditions and how
these dynamics varied around the world. Celibacy also deserves more careful scrutiny moving
away from aggregate analyses of the past toward more individual-level analyses. These margins
of fertility mattered in pre-industrial societies and deserve a stronger place in our theories of
premodern demographic change and economic development.
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Appendices
A Sample
1 Labourers/Servants incl. seamen
2 Husbandmen small farmers, weavers
3 Craftsmen tailors, carpenters
4 Traders innkeepers, butchers, bakers
5 Farmers
6 Merchants/Professionals clerks, clergy, medical
7 Gentry gentlemen, esquire
Table A.1: Social Groups Employed in the Analysis
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Died Age 9,007 45.932 21.136 16 27 43 64 104
Married 9,007 0.589 0.492 0 0 1 1 1
Labourers & Serv. 9,007 0.110 0.313 0 0 0 0 1
Husbandmen 9,007 0.086 0.280 0 0 0 0 1
Craftsmen 9,007 0.096 0.295 0 0 0 0 1
Traders 9,007 0.045 0.208 0 0 0 0 1
Farmers 9,007 0.029 0.169 0 0 0 0 1
Upper class 9,007 0.041 0.197 0 0 0 0 1
Unknown Occupation 9,007 0.593 0.491 0 0 1 1 1
Note: the means on the father’s occupational dummies show the proportion of the sample falling into
each occupational group. The largest group is the Labourers and Servants (11.1 per cent) while the
smallest one is the Farmers (2.9 per cent).
Table A.2: Sample to Compute m(c)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Spacing2 12,517 1.373 1.354 0.000 0.721 0.940 1.515 18.014
first birth 14,730 0.850 0.357 0 1 1 1 1
Table A.3: Sample to Compute z(c)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Died Age 24,260 24.964 27.373 0 1 13 47 103
Died before 15 48,514 0.256 0.436 0 0 0 1 1
Table A.4: Sample to Compute d(c)
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
At Risk for Second Birth
I(Second Birth) 12,519 0.858 0.349 0 1 1
Spacing 1st to 2nd 10,739 2.362 1.317 0.000 2.071 11.444
At Risk for Third Birth
I(Third Birth) 10,738 0.838 0.369 0 1 1
Spacing 2nd to 3rd 8,994 2.561 1.335 0.000 2.301 11.471
At Risk for Fourth Birth
I(Fourth Birth) 8,993 0.810 0.392 0 1 1
Spacing 3rd to 4th 7,283 2.632 1.339 0.000 2.389 11.808
At Risk for Fifth Birth
I(Fifth Birth) 7,280 0.780 0.414 0 1 1
Spacing 4th to 5th 5,682 2.600 1.286 0.000 2.397 9.929
At Risk for Sixth Birth
I(Sixth Birth) 5,679 0.740 0.439 0 1 1
Spacing 5th to 6th 4,204 2.594 1.265 0.000 2.400 10.203
At Risk for Seventh Birth
I(Seventh Birth) 4,201 0.704 0.456 0 1 1
Spacing 6th to 7th 2,959 2.555 1.252 0.000 2.384 9.748
At Risk for Eighth Birth
I(Eight Birth) 2,959 0.653 0.476 0 1 1
Spacing 7th to 8th 1,932 2.530 1.202 0.000 2.397 10.222
At Risk for Nineth Birth
I(Nine Birth) 1,932 0.597 0.491 0 1 1
Spacing 8th to 9th 1,154 2.475 1.244 0.000 2.286 9.463
At Risk for Tenth Birth
I(Tenth Birth) 1,154 0.545 0.498 0 1 1
Spacing 9th to 10th 629 2.303 1.113 0.000 2.162 9.841
Note: Spacing between the n and n+1 birth displays descriptive statistics
on the time in years between the births. Spacing values of zero are
possible when twins were born.
The sample size of the spacing variables and children at risk in the line
below do not always agree because we do not have precise birth dates
for a small sample of children, which prevents us of calculating spacing
between two children. These have been checked and confirmed.
Table A.5: Sample to Compute b(c)
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B Additional Data
Figure B.1: The 26 parishes of Wrigley et al. (1997) and the 3 counties of Clark and Cummins
(2015)
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Social groups
Mean Unknown 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.974 0.969 0.981 0.979 0.979 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.974
1 0.916 0.903 0.933 0.926 0.934 0.933 0.944 0.925 0.917
2 0.923 0.916 0.939 0.925 0.929 0.941 0.921 0.939 0.917
3 0.914 0.909 0.923 0.916 0.921 0.938 0.905 0.919 0.904
4 0.919 0.913 0.938 0.907 0.920 0.946 0.916 0.927 0.905
5 0.908 0.901 0.917 0.907 0.927 0.893 0.883 0.944 0.948
6 0.910 0.895 0.930 0.921 0.926 0.915 0.889 0.928 0.973
7 0.916 0.910 0.924 0.912 0.932 0.908 0.854 0.952 0.952
8 0.924 0.929 0.902 0.920 0.924 0.913 0.886 0.962 0.916
9 0.941 0.930 0.956 0.945 0.932 0.957 0.978 0.964 0.898
Note: estimated from logistic regressions
Table B.1: 5-year Survival Probabilities of Mothers by parity n and social group
Occupations P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9
Labourers, Servants 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.63 0.52 0.56
Husbandmen 0.92 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.67 0.60 0.54
Craftsmen 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.72 0.63 0.62 0.58
Traders 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.73 0.79 0.60 0.63 0.68
Farmers 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.73 0.75 0.66 0.50 0.46
Upper Class 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.79 0.72 0.70 0.56
Unknown 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.60 0.52
Note: Parity progression ratios computed from estimated survival functions 10 years after
previous birth, and assuming average levels for parish and time period dummies
Table B.2: Estimated Parity Progression Ratios Across Social Groups
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Mean age at marriage 95% conf. interval
Labourers, Servants 24.63 24.18 25.08
Husbandmen 25.45 24.95 25.95
Craftsmen 25.62 25.09 26.16
Traders 25.40 24.61 26.18
Farmers 23.83 23.06 24.60
Merchants, Professionals 25.22 24.18 26.27
Gentry 25.29 23.79 27.79
Unknown Occupation 25.67 25.47 25.86
Table B.3: Mean female age at marriage by social group
Occupation Mean number of marriages
Women Men
Labourers, Servants 1.061 1.126
Husbandmen 1.061 1,128
Craftsmen 1.063 1,124
Traders 1.064 1.135
Farmers 1.055 1.129
Merchants, Professionals 1.052 1.110
Gentry 1.048 1.123
Unknown Occupation 1.047 1.116
All 1.053 1.120
Table B.4: Mean Number of Marriages per Married Woman and Men and per occupation
Occupation Both Mother Father Both Total
Non-migrant In-Migrant In-Migrant In-Migrant
Labourers and Servants 547 277 262 371 1457
Husbandmen 372 271 157 276 1076
Craftsmen 451 263 223 252 1189
Traders 202 122 80 119 523
Farmers 144 88 36 57 325
Merchants and Professionals 174 47 64 67 352
Gentry 55 35 31 30 151
Unknown 2349 1623 1368 2104 7444
Total 4294 2726 2221 3276 12517
Table B.5: Number of marriages by migrant status
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C Individual Occupational Mobility
As mentioned in the main text, the occupations in the reconstitution data were recorded at
several points in a man’s life: at his marriage, at the baptisms of his children and at his burial.
Thus, it is possible to quantify men who moved up or down in the wealth categories during their
lifetime. In total 9 per cent of the father’s occupations in our dataset changed over the father’s
life course. Thus, we needed to figure out a way to categorise those fathers who experienced
mobility across social groups. Table C.1 shows the movement of father’s occupations between
the Clark and Cummins social groups during the father’s lifetime. The rows in the table
represent the minimum social group of the father, which could occur at marriage, baptism of a
child or burial, whereas the columns represent the maximum social group of the father. Thus,
Table C.1 does not reveal whether there was upward or downward mobility.
There were 17,666 children whose father’s minimum and maximum social group for their oc-
cupation was one, and there were 1,087 children whose father’s minimum social group was one
but also had a group two occupation listed. In order to simplify our analysis and improve our
sample size among the occupational groups, we reassigned some groups experiencing mobility
to their maximum social group. However, we only did this for social groups that could have
easily been fluid to minimise measurement error in the analysis. Thus, we assign the 1,087
observations who were mobile between groups one and two to group two since the line between
a labourer and a husbandmen was rather small. We also assigned those mobile between groups
two and three to group three (463 obs.) and those mobile between groups three and four to
group four (368 obs.). For groups five, six and seven, a more nuanced approach was required.
For the farmers, group five, it made more sense to merge them with men who were mobile
between group two, husbandmen, and five since both were agricultural occupations (230 obs.).
Likewise, assigning those mobile between groups four and six to group six made sense because
there would obviously be mobility between traders and merchants and small scale proprietors
and larger scale proprietors (578 obs.). Finally, we assigned men mobile between group five
and seven and group six and seven to group seven. There would obviously be some crossover
between farmers, professionals and gentry, but if a person was ever ascribed an occupation of
being a gentleman or esquire, they were likely to be a member of the gentry whatever their
occupation recorded elsewhere in their life (91 and 232 obs.). All other individuals experiencing
mobility were placed in the unknown occupation category.
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Note: The individuals in the table above do not represent individual men.
Instead, they represent the occupations of fathers in the dataset. Thus, a farmer
who remained a farmer across his life cycle and had six children is counted in
the table six times. Gray areas represent the persons to whom we actually
assign an occupation. White areas are assigned as unknown occupation.
Table C.1: Reassigning Fathers Mobile Between Social Groups
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D Uncertainty Surrounding the Estimates - Details
In order to measure the uncertainty surrounding our estimates of net reproduction for the
various class groups, we simulate and accumulate the errors for the four margins using the
estimates and standard errors from the regressions as described in Section 4.6 in the main text.
Table D.1 summarizes the various moments involved. Figure D.1 plots smooth kernel densities
for the sampling distribution for n(c) for each occupational group. As noted in the text, the
unknown occupational group has much lower net reproduction partially because of biases that
arise from the sources of occupations discussed at length in Section 5.3 in the main text and
in Appendix I. It has a narrower distribution because of the much larger sample size for this
groupt than the others.
We next aggregate the social classes into three larger groups as follows: the lower class in-
cludes Labourers, Servants, Husbandmen, and Craftsmen; the middle class includes Traders
and Farmers and the upper class includes Merchants, Professional and Gentry. We exclude
the group with unknown occupations. Figure D.2 plots the corresponding smooth kernel his-
tograms of the values for n(c). Table D.2 reports one-tailed mean di↵erence tests of statistical
signifance between the three groups. We find that the di↵erence in net reproduction between
the middle-class and upper-class group was statistically significant, but the other di↵erences
between groups were not quite statistically significant.
m(c) 1  z(c) b(c) 1  d(c) n(c) n¯(c)
Mean 0.76 0.87 3.77 0.75 1.87 1.87
Labourers, Servants 0.80 0.92 3.91 0.75 2.14 1.95
Husbandmen 0.77 0.91 4.00 0.75 2.09 1.99
Craftsmen 0.73 0.91 4.20 0.74 2.08 2.07
Traders 0.74 0.91 4.53 0.74 2.24 2.23
Farmers 0.82 0.87 4.12 0.75 2.21 2.06
Upper class 0.68 0.87 4.57 0.74 2.01 2.24
Unknown 0.77 0.85 3.50 0.75 1.70 1.74
Note: n(c) and n¯(c) computed from Equations (1) and (6) respectively.
Table D.1: Computed Reproductive Rates - n and n¯
47
Note: Lower class includes Labourers, Servants, Husbandmen, and Craftsmen.
Middle class includes Traders and Farmers.
Figure D.1: Sampling distributions of n(c) by social class
Note: Lower class includes Labourers, Servants, Husbandmen, and
Craftsmen. Middle class includes Traders and Farmers.
Figure D.2: Sampling distributions of n(c) by social class (black=upper, gray=middle, light
gray=lower)
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Lower Classes Middle Classes Upper Classes
Lower Classes 0.14 0.09
(0.11) (0.21)
Middle Classes 0.23
(0.04)
Note: Mean net reproduction gap between groups from the simulation with
one-tailed p-value on mean di↵erence in parentheses.
Table D.2: Tests of statistical significance on mean di↵erences between groups
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E Removing Late Marriages from the Sample
One of the interesting findings of Clark and Cummins (2015) and Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and
Weisdorf (2011) was that the survival advantage of the rich began to decline after the 1780s as
the rich began to control their fertility and opt for smaller families. Although we have included
time dummies in our analysis, one might wonder whether part of our low net reproduction
result for the upper classes could be related to this early decline in fertility among the upper
classes. To assuage fears of this, we have redone all of the regressions and calculations for
our baseline excluding marriages after 1780. The social gradient that we found is very similar
suggesting that our results are not being exclusively driven by reductions in fertility among the
wealthy in this later period (see Table E.1 and Figure E.2). In fact the hump-shaped gradient
is even more accentuated.
We also performed the simulations to understand the uncertainty around these estimates. Fig-
ure E.2 plots the sampling distributions of the net reproduction for each of the three classes.
The standard errors on the estimates did increase since the sample size was reduced by removing
the later marriages. However, the higher net reproduction point estimate for farmers shifts the
middle class distribution upward. Now the di↵erence in net reproduction between the middle
class and upper class on the one hand and between the middle class and lower class are both
statistically significant on a one-sided test of mean di↵erences (see Table E.2). The upper class
and lower class were not statistically di↵erent.
m(c) 1  z(c) b(c) 1  d(c) n(c) n¯(c)
Mean 0.77 0.87 3.73 0.74 1.87 1.87
Labourers, Servants 0.79 0.91 3.84 0.74 2.07 1.92
Husbandmen 0.79 0.91 4.03 0.75 2.15 2.04
Craftsmen 0.76 0.92 4.19 0.74 2.14 2.09
Traders 0.76 0.91 4.54 0.73 2.29 2.25
Farmers 0.86 0.88 4.12 0.74 2.33 2.07
Upper Class 0.70 0.87 4.58 0.73 2.05 2.25
Unknown 0.77 0.85 3.46 0.75 1.70 1.75
Note: n(c) and n¯(c) computed from Equations (1) and (6) respectively.
Table E.1: Computed Reproductive Rates - n and n¯ - Restricted Sample
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Notes: solid, benchmark, dotted, excluding marriages after
1780.
Figure E.1: Net reproduction rates n(c) with and without late marriages
Note: Lower class includes Labourers, Servants, Husbandmen, and
Craftsmen. Middle class includes Traders and Farmers. Sample
restricted to marriages before 1780.
Figure E.2: Sampling distributions of n(c) by social class (black=upper, gray=middle, light
gray=lower)
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Lower Classes Middle Classes Upper Classes
Lower Classes 0.19 0.07
(0.05) (0.28)
Middle Classes 0.26
(0.03)
Note: Mean net reproduction gap between groups from the simulation with
one-tailed p-value on mean di↵erence in parentheses.
Table E.2: Tests of statistical significance on mean di↵erences between groups excluding mar-
riages after 1780
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F Robustness: Non-Random Censoring
The Cox model assumes that censoring is independent of survival time. It might be di cult
to defend this assumption in the context of childlessness: it is reasonable to assume that the
probability of the mother dying (censoring) is dependent on the time she remains without a
child (survival time). One can easily think of medical conditions that a↵ect both.
We relax the independent censoring assumption in the Cox proportional hazard model using the
 -imputation method proposed by Jackson et al. (2014). The procedure generates hypothetical
datasets where individuals who were censored now have a hypothetical survival, under the
assumption that at the point of censoring the hazard function jumps by a constant  . If   < 0,
which is the relevant case for our problem, there is decreased risk (of having one child) after
censoring. By varying the size and magnitude of this constant  , and reestimating the model
under this condition, sensitivity analyses can be performed. Table F.1 reports results obtained
with the InformativeCensoring R library described in Burko↵ et al. (2016). Obviously, the
coe cients of interest are barely a↵ected by the choice of   because of the small number of
observations which are e↵ectively subject to censoring because of early death. Thus, the fact
that censoring may not be independent of the survival time does not influence our results in
practice.
Dependent variable: time to first birth
benchmark   =  5   =  0.5   =  0.1
Husbandmen  0.030  0.033  0.030  0.030
(0.051) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Craftsmen  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013
(0.050) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Traders  0.038  0.024  0.034  0.038
(0.064) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
Farmers  0.203⇤⇤⇤  0.200⇤⇤⇤  0.204⇤⇤⇤  0.205⇤⇤⇤
(0.079) (0.053) (0.062) (0.062)
Upper Class  0.204⇤⇤⇤  0.212⇤⇤⇤  0.206⇤⇤⇤  0.204⇤⇤⇤
(0.060) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Unknown Occupation  0.284⇤⇤⇤  0.294⇤⇤⇤  0.287⇤⇤⇤  0.285⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 14,730 14,730 14,730 14,730
Note: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies and 4 period dum-
mies are included. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table F.1: z(c). Relaxing independent censoring with  -imputation method
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G Robustness: In-migrants vs. Non-migrants
In this appendix, we explore whether migration poses a potential threat to the social gradient
in fertility that we found in our main results. As mentioned in the text, the only migrants that
we can observe demographic behaviour for in our sample are those who move into our parish
upon marriage, i.e. those individuals with missing baptism dates, but known marriage and
burial dates. However, aside from the urban migrants, these migrants are likely similar to those
leaving our parishes and heading to similar parishes. To this end, we examine how the social
gradients of three of our margins of female fertility looked for in-migrants compared to non-
migrants. We can measure di↵erences across three of our margins, but unfortunately we cannot
measure celibacy for in-migrants because we cannot be sure that individuals moving into the
parish were not married before migrating and we would not observe their father’s occupation.
We break our migrants into three groups: a mother in-migrant father non-migrant group; a
mother non-migrant father in-migrant group; and a final group where both husband and wife
were in-migrants. To test whether migration influenced demographic behaviour, we introduce
a dummy variable for each migrant group and interact that dummy variable with the social
groups dummies in the regressions to test for di↵erences between migrants and non-migrants
across the social groups.
Table G.1 presents the results for childlessness. Column 1 shows the baseline results from
table 1 above. Columns 2, 3 and 4 show the results for in-migrant mothers, in-migrant fathers
and both husband and wife in-migrant respectively. Controlling for various types of in-migrants
did not substantially change the coe cients on the initial social groups. There were significant
di↵erences in childlessness for certain groups of migrants. For instance, in-migrant fathers were
less likely to be childless, and families where both husband and wife were in-migrants were more
likely to be childless. However, on the whole there were no significant di↵erences between the
social gradient of non-migrants and in-migrants. There are a few possible explanations for why
joint in-migrant couples might have had higher rates of childlessness. First, we limit the data to
first marriages only in an attempt to limit the maternal age and parity e↵ects that could come
with second marriages. Second, it is possible that in-migrants married at later ages than their
non-migrant counterparts. Since female sterility is strongly linked to age, this would naturally
increase childlessness rates. Unfortunately, we do not know the ages of in-migrant mothers
because we do not observe their baptism date, so it is impossible to test this directly. However,
as Ruggles (1992) notes, out-migration in reconstitution data can bias certain estimates such as
mean age at marriage and life expectancy even if the characteristics and demographic rates of
out-migrants and non-migrants were the same. This is because if the probability of migrating is
renewed each year for all individuals at the same rate before and after marriage, then the overall
probability of migrating out of the parish before marriage is greater for people who marry at
older ages. Thus, the mean age of marriage for people in a parish may be an underestimate of
the mean age including all out-migrants. This means that it is possible that our in-migrants
(out-migrants from elsewhere) were older than the non-migrants who married in the parish.
Ruggles showed that this e↵ect could be large, but Wrigley (1994) conducted some additional
tests with the actual reconstitution data and found that the bias of out-migration on marriage
ages was very small. In the end, this could explain our higher childlessness rates and lower
marital fertility (seen below), but we cannot be sure.
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Tables G.2 and G.3 present the results of the same exercise for the parity progression ratio from
one to two children and two to three children. Again, there are very few substantial di↵erences
in the social gradient between migrants and non-migrants and controlling for the various types
of migrants does not alter the coe cients for non-migrants very much.
Table G.4 presents the results for the mortality rate of children under the age of 15. In-migrants
couples had moderately higher mortality levels for children, but there were no statistically
significant di↵erences between non-migrants and in-migrants of each specific social group. Thus,
our social gradient remains intact.
In conclusion, there were some relatively minor di↵erences in the margins of female fertility
between in-migrants and non-migrants. However, there is no significant social gradient to these
e↵ects, so not accounting for migration does not seem to strongly influence at least these three
margins of reproductive success.
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Dependent variable: Time to first birth
benchmark mother only father only both parents
Unknown Occupation  0.284⇤⇤⇤  0.265⇤⇤⇤  0.275⇤⇤⇤  0.305⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
Husbandmen  0.030  0.027  0.002  0.047
(0.041) (0.047) (0.045) (0.048)
Craftsmen  0.013  0.013  0.008  0.050
(0.039) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
Traders  0.038  0.014  0.055  0.069
(0.051) (0.058) (0.056) (0.059)
Farmers  0.203⇤⇤⇤  0.203⇤⇤⇤  0.204⇤⇤⇤  0.249⇤⇤⇤
(0.062) (0.072) (0.066) (0.069)
Upper Class  0.204⇤⇤⇤  0.190⇤⇤⇤  0.161⇤⇤⇤  0.269⇤⇤⇤
(0.053) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
Mother Migrant 0.040
(0.067)
Unknown Occupation:Mother Migrant  0.098
(0.073)
Husbandmen:Mother Migrant  0.024
(0.097)
Craftsmen:Mother Migrant  0.005
(0.097)
Traders:Mother Migrant  0.114
(0.123)
Farmers:Mother Migrant  0.014
(0.142)
Upper Class:Mother Migrant  0.088
(0.138)
Father Migrant 0.131⇤
(0.069)
Unknown Occupation:Father Migrant  0.048
(0.075)
Husbandmen:Father Migrant  0.156
(0.110)
Craftsmen:Father Migrant  0.028
(0.101)
Traders:Father Migrant 0.171
(0.140)
Farmers:Father Migrant 0.096
(0.190)
Upper Class:Father Migrant  0.228⇤
(0.133)
Both Migrant  0.275⇤⇤⇤
(0.062)
Unknown Occupation:Both Migrant 0.070
(0.066)
Husbandmen:Both Migrant 0.041
(0.093)
Craftsmen:Both Migrant 0.103
(0.093)
Traders:Both Migrant 0.076
(0.121)
Farmers:Both Migrant 0.130
(0.158)
Upper Class:Both Migrant 0.231⇤
(0.129)
Observations 14,730 14,730 14,730 14,730
Note: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies and 4 period dummies are included.⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table G.1: Cox Model. Analysis of z(c): baseline vs. in-migrant mothers, in-migrant fathers
and in-migrant couples interactions
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Dependent variable: Time to second birth
benchmark mother only father only both parents
Unknown Occupation  0.070⇤⇤  0.021  0.069⇤  0.030
(0.035) (0.045) (0.038) (0.040)
Husbandmen 0.099⇤⇤ 0.157⇤⇤⇤ 0.101⇤⇤ 0.125⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.060) (0.048) (0.051)
Craftsmen 0.126⇤⇤⇤ 0.181⇤⇤⇤ 0.105⇤⇤ 0.170⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.056) (0.047) (0.048)
Traders 0.182⇤⇤⇤ 0.265⇤⇤⇤ 0.160⇤⇤⇤ 0.236⇤⇤⇤
(0.055) (0.074) (0.060) (0.062)
Farmers 0.196⇤⇤⇤ 0.165⇤ 0.207⇤⇤⇤ 0.181⇤⇤
(0.065) (0.086) (0.069) (0.072)
Upper Class 0.197⇤⇤⇤ 0.120⇤ 0.210⇤⇤⇤ 0.158⇤⇤
(0.057) (0.072) (0.062) (0.064)
Mother Migrant  0.022
(0.058)
Unknown Occupation:Mother Migrant  0.110⇤
(0.063)
Husbandmen:Mother Migrant  0.118
(0.087)
Craftsmen:Mother Migrant  0.133
(0.085)
Traders:Mother Migrant  0.185⇤
(0.110)
Farmers:Mother Migrant 0.074
(0.129)
Upper Class:Mother Migrant 0.218⇤
(0.116)
Father Migrant  0.024
(0.074)
Unknown Occupation:Father Migrant  0.001
(0.081)
Husbandmen:Father Migrant  0.021
(0.120)
Craftsmen:Father Migrant 0.118
(0.109)
Traders:Father Migrant 0.145
(0.148)
Farmers:Father Migrant  0.106
(0.199)
Upper Class:Father Migrant  0.072
(0.144)
Both Migrant  0.019
(0.066)
Unknown Occupation:Both Migrant  0.149⇤⇤
(0.072)
Husbandmen:Both Migrant  0.113
(0.100)
Craftsmen:Both Migrant  0.210⇤⇤
(0.100)
Traders:Both Migrant  0.244⇤
(0.131)
Farmers:Both Migrant 0.095
(0.164)
Upper Class:Both Migrant 0.227
(0.138)
Observations 12,519 12,519 12,519 12,519
Note: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies and 4 period dummies are included.⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table G.2: Cox Model. Time to second child: baseline vs. in-migrant mothers, in-migrant
fathers and in-migrant couples interactions
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Dependent variable: Time to third birth
benchmark mother only father only both parents
Unknown Occupation  0.102⇤⇤⇤  0.108⇤⇤⇤  0.088⇤⇤  0.126⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043)
Husbandmen 0.070 0.103⇤ 0.056 0.062
(0.048) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
Craftsmen 0.047 0.046 0.065 0.036
(0.046) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051)
Traders 0.166⇤⇤⇤ 0.214⇤⇤⇤ 0.172⇤⇤⇤ 0.130⇤
(0.059) (0.066) (0.064) (0.067)
Farmers 0.117⇤ 0.113 0.114 0.077
(0.069) (0.080) (0.074) (0.077)
Upper Class 0.180⇤⇤⇤ 0.120⇤ 0.192⇤⇤⇤ 0.147⇤⇤
(0.061) (0.067) (0.067) (0.069)
Mother Migrant  0.005
(0.078)
Unknown Occupation:Mother Migrant 0.027
(0.085)
Husbandmen:Mother Migrant  0.129
(0.113)
Craftsmen:Mother Migrant 0.004
(0.112)
Traders:Mother Migrant  0.204
(0.144)
Farmers:Mother Migrant 0.013
(0.159)
Upper Class:Mother Migrant 0.404⇤⇤
(0.158)
Father Migrant 0.060
(0.080)
Unknown Occupation:Father Migrant  0.083
(0.088)
Husbandmen:Father Migrant 0.123
(0.126)
Craftsmen:Father Migrant  0.093
(0.117)
Traders:Father Migrant  0.031
(0.160)
Farmers:Father Migrant 0.060
(0.213)
Upper Class:Father Migrant  0.065
(0.157)
Both Migrant  0.192⇤⇤⇤
(0.073)
Unknown Occupation:Both Migrant 0.081
(0.079)
Husbandmen:Both Migrant 0.008
(0.110)
Craftsmen:Both Migrant 0.006
(0.111)
Traders:Both Migrant 0.122
(0.142)
Farmers:Both Migrant 0.156
(0.175)
Upper Class:Both Migrant 0.116
(0.150)
Observations 10,738 10,738 10,738 10,738
Note: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies and 4 period dummies are included.⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table G.3: Cox Model. Time to third child: baseline vs. in-migrant mothers, in-migrant fathers
and in-migrant couples interactions
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Dependent variable: Time to death
benchmark mother only father only both parents
Unknown Occupation 0.001 0.002  0.003 0.030
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036)
Husbandmen  0.001 0.008  0.022 0.034
(0.039) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Craftsmen 0.039 0.042 0.018 0.062
(0.036) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
Traders 0.067 0.116⇤⇤ 0.028 0.106⇤⇤
(0.046) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053)
Farmers 0.004  0.008 0.002  0.012
(0.062) (0.071) (0.068) (0.069)
Upper Class 0.071 0.098⇤ 0.047 0.078
(0.048) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055)
Mother Migrant  0.025
(0.068)
Unknown Occupation:Mother Migrant  0.011
(0.075)
Husbandmen:Mother Migrant  0.044
(0.098)
Craftsmen:Mother Migrant  0.019
(0.096)
Traders:Mother Migrant  0.330⇤⇤
(0.133)
Farmers:Mother Migrant 0.053
(0.146)
Upper Class:Mother Migrant  0.252⇤
(0.148)
Father Migrant 0.001
(0.058)
Unknown Occupation:Father Migrant 0.017
(0.066)
Husbandmen:Father Migrant 0.109
(0.091)
Craftsmen:Father Migrant 0.105
(0.086)
Traders:Father Migrant 0.207⇤
(0.112)
Farmers:Father Migrant 0.007
(0.171)
Upper Class:Father Migrant 0.112
(0.113)
Both Migrant 0.122⇤⇤
(0.059)
Unknown Occupation:Both Migrant  0.115⇤
(0.066)
Husbandmen:Both Migrant  0.148
(0.091)
Craftsmen:Both Migrant  0.093
(0.086)
Traders:Both Migrant  0.169
(0.112)
Farmers:Both Migrant 0.160
(0.159)
Upper Class:Both Migrant  0.018
(0.113)
Observations 48,514 48,514 48,514 48,514
Note: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies and 4 period dummies are included.⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table G.4: Cox Model. Analysis of d(c). Time to death: baseline vs. in-migrant mothers,
in-migrant fathers and in-migrant couples interactions
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H Men’s Reproductive Success
Although we have presented our baseline results in the main paper from the perspective of
women, we are also able to produce the same statistics for men, and there is some reason to
believe that these may actually be more accurate in reflecting fertility di↵erences by occupa-
tional group. Because female occupations were very rarely recorded in parish records, we have
to assign a woman’s occupational class in relation to the men in her life. When calculating
the marriage rate, we use her father’s occupation, and for the other three margins, we use her
husband’s occupation. If there was not strong marital homogamy, there could be measurement
error in the occupational groups, which might lead to a di↵erent pattern across groups.
Thus, we present the equivalent regression tables and graphs for men that we included in the
original paper for women. In the case of men, there were a few additional issues that needed
to be dealt with to estimate the results. First, men were nearly twenty times more likely to
baptise children in a parish without having been married in the parish, i.e. we do not observe
the father’s marriage date. It seems that men would occasionally get married in their spouse’s
parish, but then return to their home parish to live. Thus, we count all men who returned
to their parish of birth to baptise children as being married even if we do not observe their
marriage date. However, we need a marriage date to estimate the risk of marriage, so we
imputed their marriage date to be one year before the birth of their first child. We do not use
these individuals in calculating z(c) and b(c) though because the results would be sensitive to
our imputed marriage dates.
Another potential issue is remarriage since men could remarry and continue to produce o↵-
spring at much later ages than women. Remarriage would obviously not influence the celibacy,
childlessness or child mortality margins, but it could potentially influence the marital fertility
of wealth groups. However, given the data constraints in determining the marriage order of
individuals and the minuscule di↵erences in marriage order across wealth groups, described
in Section 4.2 of the main text and in Table B.4, we proceed just using the births from first
marriages. Excluding remarriage likely leads to an overstatement of childlessness rates in men
since some men who had childless first marriages would go on to have children in a second
marriage and underestimate marital fertility since the children in second marriages would not
be counted.
Finally, we also update all factors that were specific to women for men, so we adjust the parity
progression ratios for male mortality rather than female mortality. This is especially important
since men would not have su↵ered the high death rates in childbirth that women did.
Table H.1 reports the regressions form(c), z(c) and d(c), the equivalent of table 1 above, and the
predicted marriage rates and childless rates for men are presented next to the rates for women
in figures H.1 and H.2. The greater celibacy and childlessness of the upper classes holds when
looking at fertility for men. In fact, the gradients across classes are even larger. We also see
that b(c) for men has been shifted upward relative to women in figure H.3 although the gradient
is more or less the same. This higher level of fertility then produces a higher net reproduction
rate for men relative to women (figure H.5) when all of the calculations are completed. Overall,
the general patterns of net reproduction reamin. When the extensive margin is held at average
levels, we find that the upper classes had higher fertility than the middle and lower classes
(see Table H.2 and Figure H.5). However, when we allow the extensive margin to vary across
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social groups, the upper classes have the lowest level of fertility by a large margin. Their net
reproduction rate is far below the lower classes, and the middle classes maintain the highest
net reproduction.
time to time to time to
marriage first birth death
m(c) z(c) d(c)
Husbandmen  0.089  0.007 0.003
(0.057) (0.043) (0.040)
Craftsmen  0.044 0.003 0.038
(0.055) (0.041) (0.038)
Traders  0.201⇤⇤⇤  0.015 0.093⇤⇤
(0.069) (0.053) (0.047)
Farmers  0.139⇤  0.237⇤⇤⇤ 0.025
(0.076) (0.064) (0.063)
Upper Class  0.446⇤⇤⇤  0.252⇤⇤⇤ 0.088⇤
(0.075) (0.055) (0.050)
Unknown Occupation  0.031  0.250⇤⇤⇤  0.003
(0.046) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 11,080 13,292 45,887
Note: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies and
4 period dummies are included. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table H.1: Cox Model. Analysis of m(c), z(c), d(c) for men
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Note: filled blue, women; filled red with borders, men.
Figure H.1: Computed Marriage rates: the point of view of men
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Figure H.2: Computed Childlessness Rate: the point of view of men
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Figure H.3: Computed Births: the point of view of men
m(c) 1  z(c) b(c) 1  d(c) n(c) n¯(c)
Mean 0.81 0.88 4.10 0.75 2.20 2.20
Labourers, Servants 0.83 0.92 4.21 0.75 2.41 2.26
Husbandmen 0.80 0.92 4.49 0.75 2.49 2.41
Craftsmen 0.81 0.92 4.53 0.75 2.53 2.41
Traders 0.76 0.92 4.94 0.74 2.55 2.60
Farmers 0.78 0.86 4.56 0.75 2.33 2.45
Upper 0.68 0.86 4.99 0.74 2.14 2.62
Unknown 0.82 0.86 3.78 0.75 2.01 2.03
Note: n(c) and n¯(c) computed from the point of view of men.
Table H.2: Computed Reproductive Rates - n and n¯
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Notes: dark grey line: n(c). light grey line: n¯(c). Data from
Table H.2.
Figure H.4: Net reproduction rates Across Social Groups
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Figure H.5: Net reproduction rates n(c) : the point of view of men
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I Robustness: Source of Occupations
As mentioned before, the occupations in our data could have been recorded at three types
of events: a marriage, a baptism of a child, and a death. For our general analysis, we did
not distinguish between these three, but for the childlessness rates, we worried that the pattern
across social groups could be skewed if we were more likely to observe an individual’s occupation
if they had children. This would be true if an individual’s occupation was observed in a baptism
register. Thus, in this robustness check, we limit the occupations to those given at marriage
or burial, moving the other individuals into the unknown occupation category. Table I.1 shows
what this implies for the sample size of the di↵erent groups.
The results of the Cox regression for the probability to move from zero to one child are pre-
sented in Table I.2. The first column is the one reported in the main text, while the second
column is based on the alternative way of defining occupations. After removing the occupations
obtained from baptism registers, all of the occupation groups become insignificant, though the
basic gradient in childlessness remains across all classes. Farmers and the upper classes have
much higher rates of childlessness although these rates are insignificant because of the smaller
sample size under the restricted occupations. We also see a sharp decrease in the childlessness
rate of couples of unknown occupation, which confirms our suspicion that the high rates of
childlessness in this group were largely driven by this issue. We do not use this as our pri-
mary specification because the sample size for each occupational category shrinks a lot when
restricting occupations, increasing the standard errors. Figure I.1 shows the average levels of
childlessness between the two specifications and confirms these findings.
We also re-estimated all the parity progression ratios with the alternative definition of occupa-
tions and compute the gross fertility of women using Equation (5). As Figure I.2 shows, the
source of occupations does not strongly influence the gross marital fertility of women in our
dataset. The general class gradient remains the same or even becomes slightly more pronounced.
Figure I.3 displays the female net reproduction rates recalculated from all of the various re-
gressions. The net reproduction of the lower classes decreases a bit since removing the baptism
occupations increased their childlessness and decreased their fertility. However, the general gra-
dient holds. The middle classes have higher net reproduction rates than the lower and upper
classes. Thus, the source of occupations does not explain away the social gradient found in our
baseline results.
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benchmark excluding occupations from baptism registry
Labourers, servants 1665 996
Husbandmen 1222 846
Craftsmen 1371 919
Traders 603 415
Farmers 379 241
Merchants, Professionals 406 359
Gentry 183 149
Unknown Occupation 8901 10805
Table I.1: Number of married women with known death date
benchmark excluding occupations from baptism registry
time to time to
first birth first birth
Husbandmen  0.030  0.008
(0.041) (0.051)
Craftsmen  0.013 0.0278
(0.039) (0.050)
Traders  0.038  0.013
(0.051) (0.064)
Farmers  0.203⇤⇤⇤  0.107
(0.062) (0.079)
Upper Class  0.204⇤⇤⇤  0.092
(0.053) (0.060)
Unknown Occupation  0.284⇤⇤⇤  0.083⇤
(0.032) (0.038)
Observations 14,730 14,730
Note: Reference category is Labourers/Servants. 26 parish dummies and 4 period dum-
mies are included. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table I.2: With and without Recording Occupations from Baptism Registry: z(c)
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Figure I.1: Computed Childlessness Rate with Alternative Definition of Occupations
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Figure I.2: Computed Births with Alternative Definition of Occupations
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Notes: filled grey, benchmark; solid white, alternative.
Figure I.3: Net reproduction rates n(c) across Social Groups of the Baseline compared with the
Sample Excluding Occupations from Baptism Registers
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